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The division of authority between trial and appellate courts is demarcated by
the final judgment rule. Ordinarily, all appellate review of the orders made by a
trial judge is postponed until the trial judge has rendered a final judgment.2 The
rule ensures that two courts do not attempt to exercise jurisdiction over the same
case at the same time, permits the trial judge relative freedom to direct
proceedings before judgment, discourages abuse of process, and conserves
judicial resources by preventing piecemeal review and by preventing review of
interlocutory orders that may be mooted later in the proceedings.3 Because of its
fundamental importance in dividing the work of a multi-tiered court system, the
final judgment rule has been called "the dominant rule of appellate jurisdiction."4
In most cases, the rule is clear and its application unremarkable, but
sometimes rigid adherence to the rule would result in unjust or even absurd
results. To mitigate against its occasional harshness, both Congress and the
courts have developed a number of exceptions to the rule that permit appellate
review of certain interlocutory orders. 6 But these exceptions are not without
difficulties of their own.7 And because the exceptions to the rule delineate the
true scope of appellate jurisdiction,8 it is essential that they be accurately
mapped, that overlap among various exceptions to the rule be minimized, and
that those exceptions be supported by strong principles so that their application
to novel situations is as orderly and predictable as possible.

1. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 330 (1940) ("The doctrine of finality is a
phase of the distribution of authority within the judicial hierarchy.").
2. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006) (granting the Supreme Court jurisdiction over "[flinal
judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State"); 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (granting
federal courts of appeals jurisdiction over "appeals from all final decisions of the district courts");
Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction,48 B.C. L. REv. 1237, 1238 (2007) ("[The]
final judgment rule ... ordinarily postpones any appellate review until the district court reaches a
final judgment.").
3. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981); Riyaz A. Kanji,
The ProperScope ofPendentAppellate Jurisdiction in the CollateralOrder Context, 100 YALE L.J.

511, 512 (1990). Where the appeal is to the Supreme Court from a state court of last resort, the
final judgment rule also preserves federalism interests. See Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma,
334 U.S. 62, 67 (1948).
4.
Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: DiscretionaryReview of Interlocutory
Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 184 (2001).
5.
See Martin H. Redish, The PragmaticApproach to Appealability in the FederalCourts,

75 COLUM. L. REv. 89, 90 (1975).
6.

See id.

7. Steinman, supra note 2, at 1252 ("[T]he process for invoking [the collateral order
doctrine] and determining whether it applies in particular situations is inefficient in a number of
situations.").
8. Id. at 1238.
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Predictability has been an elusive goal in the courts' implementation of the
final judgment rule. Many commentators have severely criticized the rule9 and,
in particular, the courts' seemingly ad hoc application of one important
exception: the collateral order doctrine. 10 Proposals for reform have tended to
fall into two camps. The larger group proposes an expanded version of
discretionary interlocutory review.
A smaller group has advocated for the
entire abolition of appeals as of right.12 The vast majority of commentators,
however, agree that the current appellate system generally functions well.13 The
debate-and the problems-appear at the margins.14 Accordingly, rather than
wholesale revision or repudiation of the final judgment rule, I propose to
examine the principles underlying its chief exceptions in relation to their current
application. Harmonizing the rule's application with its foundational principles
would bring considerable clarity to a much maligned area of law.15
This Article proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, I trace the history of the final
judgment rule from its common law roots prior to the Judiciary Act of 1789 to its
present incarnation in §§ 1291 and 1257 of the Judicial Code. I also lay out the
major statutory and rule-based exceptions to the rule in this Part.
In Part II, I describe the evolution of the major judicially-crafted exceptions
to the final judgment rule. In Part JI.A, I divide the major exceptions into three
functional groups: effective finality, practical finality, and partial effective
finality. In Part II.A.1, I show that, consistent with the Supreme Court's early
admonition that courts should give finality a practical construction, the courts of
appeals have concluded that their jurisdiction extends to orders that effectively,
though not technically, end the litigation at hand. Part II.A.2 introduces practical
finality, a concept that has been all but rejected, but which, nonetheless, is
important to an analysis of the current state of appellate jurisdiction. Part II.A.3
concerns partial effective finality, including the well-known and often criticized
collateral order doctrine. Here, I show that the doctrine was initially a close
cousin of other early practical constructions of finality. Over time, however, the

9.
Glynn, supra note 4, at 176, 180-81 (citing Howard B. Eisenberg & Alan B. Morrison,
DiscretionaryAppellate Review of Non-Final Orders: It's Time to Change the Rules, 1 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 285, 291 (1999); Maurice Rosenberg, Solving the FederalFinality-Appealability
Problem, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1984, at 171, 172 (1984)); Redish, supra note 5, at
91 (citing DAVID P. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 308 (2d ed. 1975);
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 101, at 455-58 (2d ed.
1970)); Steinman, supra note 2, at 1238-39 (noting various epithets scholars have used to describe
federal appellate jurisdiction).
10. See Steinman, supra note 2, at 1252-57.
11. Glynn, supra note 4, at 178 n.7 (citing multiple commentators calling for an expanded
version of discretionary review as a replacement or supplement to the exceptions of the current
rule).
12. Id. at 184 n.33.
13. See id. at 185 ("There is general agreement that, on balance, the policies underlying the
final judgment rule justify the costs it may impose in most cases.").
14. Id. at 203-04.
15. Id. at 204.
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doctrine has become mired in judicial language and divorced from its underlying
foundation. Loosed from its moorings, the Supreme Court has recently
narrowed the scope of the collateral order doctrine, largely for lack of limiting
principles. Today, the doctrine is the most significant judge-made exception to §
1291, and although its application is generally consistent, the underlying
principles guiding that consistency are unclear. Part II.B introduces appellate
mandamus, a judicial creation based on the ancient common law writ. In this
part, I distinguish appellate mandamus from the device of the same name that
may be sought in district courts against executive officers and discuss how the
scope of this extraordinary remedy has expanded beyond the realm it was
originally intended to fill.
In Part III, I suggest recasting the requirement that an order be "completely
separate from the merits" (or, at least, "conceptually distinct") to qualify for
appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Instead, I propose that, to qualify, an
order simply must belong to a class of orders that are unlikely to be mooted by
future orders downstream in the litigation. This small change would have
several important advantages. First, it would bring the collateral order doctrine
back into line with its original principles and with the other practical applications
of the final judgment rule. Second, tying the doctrine to a principle rather than
to judicial rhetoric provides a basis on which future cases can be soundly
decided. Third, it would move a number of issues that are currently heard on
petitions for writs of mandamus into the usual channels for appellate review.
This shift would reduce the breadth of appellate mandamus, which has expanded
beyond the realm it was initially intended to fill. Thus, a modest change-a
simple reassessment of the grounds supporting the collateral order doctrine in
light of the other doctrines of finality-has the potential to harmonize much of
the current discord of appellate jurisdiction.
I.

THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE

A.

HistoricalOrigins

Systems of law that employ appellate tribunals must address the question of
when appeals may be taken from a lower court to a higher one. The answer
implicates a number of policy considerations regarding the administration of
justice. Unfettered resort to appellate courts may increase judicial accuracy, but
it does so at a high price: delay, increased cost to litigants, inefficient use of
judicial time, and increased opportunity for bad faith appeals designed to harass
opposing parties to name a few. 16 On the other hand, an inflexible requirement
that all aggrieved parties in all situations must wait to appeal an erroneous
interlocutory order may cause an action to be adjudicated "unjustly, slowly, and

16. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981); Kanji, supra note
3, at 512.
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expensively." 17 As the Supreme Court has explained, "the considerations that
always compete in the question of appealability .

..

are the inconvenience and

costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by
delay on the other."18
Prohibition of appeals from interlocutory orders extends back to Roman
times. 19 The origin of the modem final judgment rule in the United States,
however, appears to derive from the historic practice in England by which a
judgment of one of the common law courts could be reviewed in the Court of
King's Bench on a writ of error. 2 0 But there had to be a judgment and a record
before the King's Bench could act.2 1 Counsel in one case argued that the court
could not proceed because the record from the court of first instance had not
been produced, and the writ could not support two records in two courts
simultaneously. 22
By the time of Blackstone, pronouncements by the masters in the Court of
Chancery were divided into orders, interlocutory decrees, and final decrees.23
Unlike the King's Bench, however, the Chancellor awarded relief from all three
types of pronouncements24 and never applied the final judgment rule to suits in
equity.25 This was due in part to the unsuitability of the simple common law
forms of action to the complicated cases that came before the Chancellor.26
The distinction between appealability in law and equity was not adopted in
the United States, and the confusion in this country surrounding appealability
began almost immediately.27 American appellate courts were frequently
established to hear both law and equity cases. Often the common law writ of
error was the method for review of equitable claims, and appellate courts, not
surprisingly, tended toward application of the common law rule of finality to
both legal and equitable matters because both came before the court through the

17.

See 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,

§ 3913, at 317 (2d ed. 1992); cf FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("[The
federal rules] should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.").
18. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950).
19. See Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

540-41 (1932) (citing ARTHUR ENGELMANN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE

§§

84-85 (Robert Wyness Millar ed. & trans., 1927)).
20. Id. at 541, 543-44; John C. Nagel, Note, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory
Appeals Jurisprudence with Discretionary Review, 44 DUKE L.J. 200, 202 (1994) (citing 15A
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 17,

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

§ 3906,

at 264).

See Crick, supra note 19, at 541-42.
Id. (citing Reports of Cases in Easter Term, 1343 Y.B. KING EDWARD 111226, 234).
Id. at 545-46.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 547.
Id. at 548.
Id. at 548-50.
Id. at 550.
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common law writ process.29 State courts were therefore forced to engineer
"elaborate logical exercises in order to escape from the strict application of the
restriction" 3 0-a theme that would be repeated in the Supreme Court's later
jurisprudence interpreting the federal final judgment rule.
B. Statutory Reach

The Judiciary Act of 178931 has been called "probably the most important
and the most satisfactory Act ever passed by Congress."32 The Act provided
appellate jurisdiction in circuit courts over admiralty and maritime matters in
excess of three hundred dollars or over civil actions in excess of fifty dollars.33
The Act provided appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over civil actions
in excess of two thousand dollars. 34 Similarly, the Act provided for review upon
a writ of error of a final judgment or decree of the highest court of a state.35 The
reason the early state practice of applying a strict finality requirement to appeals
from both legal and equitable claims was incorporated into the Judiciary Act is
unknown, 36 but Congress likely sought to emulate state practice in the federal
courts. 37
The finality provisions of the Judiciary Act remain largely unchanged
today. 38 Section 1291 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code provides that "the courts of
appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States ... except where a direct review may be had
in the Supreme Court." 39 Section 1257, which corresponds to the pertinent
provisions in § 25 of the Judiciary Act, provides that "[f]inal judgments or
decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had,
may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where [a federal

29. Id. at 550 n.55 (citing Blaine v. Ship Charles Carter, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 22 (1800);
Johnson's Adm'rs v. Henry's Ex'rs, 1 Minor 13 (Ala. 1820)).
30. Id. at 548.
31. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789)
[hereinafter "Judiciary Act of 1789"].
32. Aaron R. Petty, Matters in Abatement, 11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 137, 139 (2010)
(quoting Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the FederalJudiciaryAct of] 789, 37 HARV.
L. REv. 49, 52 (1923)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 21-22, 1 Stat. at 83-85.
34. Id.
35. § 25, 1 Stat. at 85-87.
36. Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality andAppealability by Court Rule: Right Problem,
Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REv. 717, 727 (1993) (citing Crick, supra note 19, at 548, 549 n.48).
37.

But see WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supranote 17,

§ 3906, at 264 n.4 (suggesting that

a

desire to avoid "interminable" delays possible in English chancery proceedings was influential in
crafting the act); cf CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Gordon N. Ray ed., Riverside Press 1956)

(1853) (discussing fictional generations-long chancery case Jarndyce andJarndyce).
38. Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798 (1989) (noting that the final
judgment rule "has changed little" since the adoption of the Judiciary Act).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).
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question is raised]." 40 The Supreme Court has defined a "final decision" as one
that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but
execute the judgment." 41
In light of this seemingly universal ban on interlocutory appeals, Congress
has provided some relief. Section 1292(a) allows interlocutory review of certain
listed orders, notably orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or
dissolving injunctions." 42 Section 1292(b), enacted by the Interlocutory Appeals
Act of 1958 , allows for interlocutory appeal where the district judge certifies
that the order "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from
the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."A4
Once certified, the court of appeals may, in its discretion, permit the appeal.45
Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure similarly provides for
interlocutory review where the district judge enters final judgment as to one or
more claims or parties and "expressly determines that there is no just reason for
delay." 4 6 Section 1453(c)(1) grants the court of appeals discretion to accept
appeals from orders granting or denying motions to remand class actions to state

40. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006). This Article concerns only appeals from district courts.
Supreme Court review of state court decisions and other specialized proceedings, including finality
of bankruptcy court orders, present additional considerations and are worthy of full treatment
individually. See generally Carlos J. Cuevas, JudicialCode Section 158: The FinalOrderDoctrine,

18 Sw. U. L. REV. 1 (1988) (discussing the application of the final order doctrine in corporate
reorganization and liquidation cases); Timothy B. Dyk, Supreme Court Review of Interlocutory
State-Court Decisions: "The Twilight Zone of Finality," 19 STAN. L. REV. 907 (1967) (proposing

that Congress should eliminate the finality requirement from Section 1257 in Supreme Court review
of state court cases); Judy Beckner Sloan, Appellate Jurisdiction of Interlocutory Appeals in
Bankruptcy 28 U.S.C. Section 158(d): A Case of Lapsus Calami, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 265 (1991)

(proposing a statutory solution providing for complete appellate jurisdiction, including over
interlocutory appeals, in bankruptcy cases and proceedings); Note, The Finality Rule for Supreme
Court Review of State Court Orders, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1004 (1978) (examining the role and

application of the finality principle in cases involving Supreme Court review of state court
decisions); Joseph Mitzel, Note, When Is an Order Final?: A Result-Oriented Approach to the
Finality Requirementfor Bankruptcy Appeals to Federal Circuit Courts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1337

(1990) (discussing a federal circuit split on interpretation of the finality requirement of 28 U.S.C. §
158(d) when a district court reverses and remands a case to a bankruptcy court, and proposing
adoption of the pragmatic approach to interpreting finality used in other legal contexts as the
solution); Note, The Requirement ofa FinalJudgment or Decreefor Supreme CourtReview ofState

Courts, 73 YALE L.J. 515 (1964) (discussing the Supreme Court's interpretation of the finality
requirement for review of state court decisions following Construction Laborers' Union v. Curry
and Mercantile NationalBank v. Langdeau).

41. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (citing St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S.
R.R. Co. v. S. Express Co., 108 U.S. 24, 28 (1883)).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2006). This section also provides for interlocutory review of
orders involving the appointment of receivers and the winding up of receiverships and of orders
determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases. § 1292(a)(2)-(3).
43. Pub. L. No. 85-919, 72 Stat. 1770 (1958) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006)).
44. § 1292(b).
45. Id.

46. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
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court, 47 and from certain other rulings on subject-matter jurisdiction. 48 Finally,
appeals may be taken from certain interlocutory orders under the Federal
Arbitration Act. 4 9 Congress adds to this list from time to time.
In addition to these exceptions, two statutes grant the Supreme Court
authority to promulgate rules defining when a ruling is final for purposes of §
1291 and authorizing appeals from additional categories of interlocutory
orders. 0 The Supreme Court has used this authority just once, when it
promulgated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2 3 (f),5 which authorizes
discretionary appeals from orders granting or denying class certification.52 The
most significant exceptions to the final judgment rule, however, are not based in
statutes or rules but instead are practical interpretations of the statutes governing
appellate jurisdiction.53
II. JUDICIALLY-CRAFTED EXCEPTIONS TO THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE

The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that finality "is to be given a
'practical rather than a technical construction."' 54 Courts have applied this
directive through two primary vehicles. The first and most commonly used is
practical construction of § 1291 to allow appeals in situations where, although
there is more to be done than simply enter judgment, there is nonetheless
effective finality, partial effective finality, or (although it has now been
disapproved) practical finality. 5 In addition, courts of appeals have interpreted

47.
48.
49.
50.

28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (2006).
28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(3) (2006).
9 U.S.C. § 16 (2006).
28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(e), (2072(c) (2006).

51.

ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS

§ 7:38,

at 108

(4th ed. 2002) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f)).
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f). This rule was promulgated under § 1292(e). CONTE & NEWBERG,
supra note 50. Section 2072(c) has gone unused "because it invites the question whether a
particular rule truly 'defines' or instead expands appellate jurisdiction." Blair v. Equifax Check
Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 833 (7th Cir. 1999). Section 1292(e) authorizes expansion. Id.
53. Steinman, supra note 2, at 1246-47. The Supreme Court has cautioned that practical
constructions of the final judgment rule are not truly "exceptions" to it. Swint v. Chambers Cnty.
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 41-42 (1995) (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S.
863, 867 (1994)). The semantics make no difference for the purposes of this Article.
54. Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)); see also Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 306 (1962) ("A pragmatic approach to the question of finality has been considered
essential to the achievement of the 'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
. . . ."' (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1)); Bronson v. R.R. Co., 67 U.S. (2 Black) 524, 531 (1862) ("[T]his
Court has not therefore understood the words 'final decrees,' in this strict and technical sense, but
has given to them a more liberal, and, as we think, a more reasonable construction ..... (quoting
Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 203 (1848)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
55. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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the All Writs Act56 to invest them with mandamus power over the district courts
that, although it stops short of a generalized discretionary power of review,
extends well beyond merely compelling or prohibiting actions in the district
court.57
A. JudicialInterpretationof28 U.S. C. § 1291
The final judgment rule has been applied pragmatically for more than 150
years. The Supreme Court's first foray into finality, in Forgay v. Conrad,
established for the first time that a flexible approach to finality might be
appropriate under certain circumstances. Because proceedings were effectively,
though not technically, final, and because the order in question required
immediate delivery of roperty, the Supreme Court held that the order was final
for purposes of § 1291. Although Forgay itself has largely been superseded by
rule, the proposition that orders that effectively end the litigation are appealable
has remained as the standard.60
Recent cases applying this framework, however, have cautioned that the
legal effect that an effectively final order has on a party's ability to proceed as a
legal matter must be distinguished from the practical effect that a given
interlocutory order may have on a party's willingness to proceed, for example, as
a financial matter.61 Although for a time some courts concluded that orders that
effectively terminate litigation as a legal matter are final,62 the Supreme Court
has held that orders that simply make it undesirable or financially unwise to
continue are not immediately appealable under § 1291. 63
The most important and most contentious exception to the final judgment
rule is partial effective finality. A partial effectively final order, like an

56. See Pub. L. No. 61-475, 36 Stat. 1156 (1911) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1651
(2006)).
57. See discussion infra Part II.B.
58. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848).
59. Id.
60. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 715 (1996) (quoting Catlin v. United
States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)) (holding that an abstention-based remand order was appealable as
a final decision despite the fact that it did "not meet the traditional definition of finality"); Moses H.
Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. 460 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) (holding that a district court's
stay order was final for purposes of appellate jurisdiction because the stay amounted to dismissal of
the suit).
61. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 10 n.11 (contrasting the situation where "the district
court refuses to allow the plaintiff to litigate his claim in federal court" from the "death knell"
situation where a plaintiff "might terminate a suit as a practical matter because the named plaintiff
would lack an economic incentive to pursue his individual claim").
62. See Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 154 (1964) (finding that a "marginal case
[was] final and appealable"); United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 1961) ("[A]n
order, otherwise nonappealable, determining substantial rights of the parties which will be
irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment may be appealed immediately under section
1291.").
63. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469-77 (1978).
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effectively final order, leaves something more to do than simpl y enter judgment,
but does so with regard to fewer than all parties or claims.
This category
includes the collateral order doctrine derived from the Supreme Court's opinion
in Cohen v. Beneficial IndustrialLoan Corp.,65 along with most contempt orders
and the somewhat obscure Perlman doctrine.66 Although initially the collateral
order doctrine operated similarly to Forgay and other effective finality decisions,
the Supreme Court has subsequently narrowed the scope of the doctrine to the
point where today it is largely limited to immunities from trial. Further
67
expansion appears unlikely.
1. Effective Finality

The Supreme Court's practical interpretation of the final judgment rule
began with the notion of what I call "effective finality." The first such decision
came in 1848 in Forgay v. Conrad.68 Forgay, however, was soon limited,69 and
later was largely eclipsed by statute.70 But it did establish two important
principles: first, that effective finality, at least in some circumstances, could be a
basis to conclude that the final judgment rule was satisfied, and second, that
hardship to the parties should not be ignored.7 Hardship appears again in the
mid-twentieth century practical finality cases.72 Other, more recent cases apply
Forgay's notion of effective finality to orders that similarly effectively end
litigation in federal court or require immediate transfer of property.73 By the
1960s, a move was underway to make finality more dependent on the immediate

64. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949)
(discussing the appealability of an order that addressed only the defendant's right to protection
under a state statute and that was separate from the merits of the case).
65. See id. at 546. ("This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally determine
claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be
denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be
deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.").
66. See Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 12 (1918) (holding that the denial of a nonparty's claim of privilege may be immediately appealed).
67. Glynn, supra note 4, at 212 ("[T]wo recently emphasized limitations . . . effectively
preclude expansion of the doctrine.").
68. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848).
69.

WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 17,

§ 3910, at

308 (citing Pulliam v. Christian,

47 U.S. (6 How.) 209 (1848); Perkins v. Fourniquet, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 206 (1848)) ("[Perkins and
Pulliam] gave clear notice that [Forgay's]principle was not to become a broad one.").
70. Glynn, supra note 4, at 187-88 (noting the disuse of Forgay as a basis for appellate
jurisdiction in light of 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) & 1292(a)(2)).
71.

WRIGHT, MILLER& COOPER, supranote 17,

§ 3910,

at 306-307.

72. See infra Part ll.A.2.
73. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711-15 (1996) (holding that
the lower court's abstention-based remand order was appealable as a final decision); Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. 460 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1983) (holding a court order denying a
party's arbitration rights to be "final for purposes of appellate jurisdiction").

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol62/iss2/4

10

Petty: The Hidden Harmony of Appellate Jurisdiction

2010]

THE HIDDEN HARMONY OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION

363

effects of the order under review, 74 and it saw fruition in the Court's practical
finality cases. 75
a. Forgay v. Conrad
The Supreme Court's 1848 decision in Forgay v. Conradwas the Court's
first exposition on the final judgment rule. 76 The circuit court had ordered the
defendants to deliver to the plaintiff, assignee in bankruptcy, property that the
debtor had previously fraudulently conveyed to the defendants.
The lower
court's order "not only decide[d] the title to the property in dispute, and
annul[ed] the deeds under which the defendants claim[ed], but also direct[ed] the
property in dispute to be delivered to the complainant, and award[ed]
execution."7 8 The lower court, however, retained jurisdiction to complete an
accounting.79
The Supreme Court held that the order was final.8 0 The Court concluded
that the lower court's decree resolved all matters as to all parties-the
accounting being merely a determination of what was owed rather than who was
legally in the right.8 1 The Court noted that no further action in the lower court,
apart from a motion for reconsideration, would affect the outcome of the case.82
The Court was particularly troubled that, because the legal rights of the parties
had been established and the lower court's order was given immediate effect,
postponing review could subject the defendants to irreparable injury. 83 If the
lower court's order to turn over the property was carried out and the property
was sold to pay the debtor's creditors, the defendants would not be able to
defend their rights to the property on appeal.84
The Court was careful to distinguish this case from those cases where the
money or property is kept within the jurisdiction of the court for the pendency of
proceedings.8 And, indeed, several decisions following Forgay establish that
the holding cannot be applied where the order in question does not call for the
immediate transfer of property. 86 Subsequent cases applied Forgay by holding

74. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.c.
75. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
76. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supranote 17, § 3910, at 306 (citing Forgay v. Conrad, 47
U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848)) ("Forgay ... provided the first secure basis for interpreting the final
judgment requirement flexibly. . . .") (emphasis added).
77. Forgay,47 U.S. (6 How.) at 203.
78. Id. at 204.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 204-05.
86. See, e.g., Craighead v. Wilson, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 199, 202 (1855) (distinguishing
between a case involving only an accounting and the situation in Forgay, which included an
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that orders are final when they require immediately divesting of or restoring
possession of property.8 7 But the early cases limiting Forgay's reach ensured
that it would never become a widely used basis for appellate jurisdiction, and
lower courts have largely followed the Supreme Court's admonition that orders
directing the immediate transfer of property generally should not be entered as
interlocutory.8 8 In any event, the current utility of Forgay has largely been
overtaken by statutory developments.
Congress has now provided for
discretionary interlocutory appeal of bankruptcy orders in the courts of appeals,89
and orders directing the immediate transfer of property are rare outside of the
bankruptcy context.o
Despite its lack of practical application today, the importance of Forgay as a
watershed decision in the development of the law of appellate jurisdiction cannot
be underestimated. Most importantly, Forgay established that "[the Supreme
Court] ha[d] not heretofore understood the words 'final decrees' in [a] strict and
technical sense, but ha[d] given to them a more liberal, and . . . a more

reasonable construction, and one more consonant to the intention of the
legislature." 91 How liberal a construction Congress provided for remains the
focus of all further development of final judgment jurisprudence. Forgay also
established two foundational principles of effective finality. First, it attempted a
"reasonable construction" of the final judgment rule by declaring that ministerial
acts remaining to be completed by the trial court will not prevent finality when
all other proceedings have concluded.92 Second, Forgay explained that hardship
to the parties may be a relevant criterion in determining whether the final
judgment rule has been satisfied.93 Hardship, however, did not come into full

immediate divesting of property); Pulliam v. Christian, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 209, 212 (1848) (holding
that a decree involving an accounting of matters arising under a trust is not final and cannot be
appealed); Perkins v. Fourniquet, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 206, 208-09 (1848) (distinguishing between an
ordinary interlocutory order in preparation of a final hearing and Forgay).
87. See, e.g., Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 127 (1945) ("Since, by
awarding an execution, the Nebraska Supreme Court directed immediate possession of the property
to be transferred, the case comes squarely within Forgay v. Conrad, and Carondelet Canal Co. v.
Louisiana, and the challenge to our jurisdiction cannot be sustained." (citations omitted) (citing
Forgay, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201; Carondelet Canal Co. & Navigation Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U.S. 362
(1914))); Carondelet, 233 U.S. at 371 ("The judgment disposes of and orders the delivery of
practically all of the property sued for .... That is, all was decreed that it was the purpose of the
suit to have decreed and which not only constituted its success, but which involved and disposed of
the Federal right asserted by the canal company. The judgment, therefore, has a substantial
finality.").
88. See Forgay,47 U.S. (6 How.) at 205-06.
89. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) (2006).
90. Glynn, supra note 4, at 188. Outside of the bankruptcy context, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)
provides for appellate jurisdiction over orders in the nature of injunctions. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b) may also provide some relief in similar situations. See Glynn, supra note 4, at 188
n.44 ("54(b) may also provide a vehicle for review in certain contexts ....
91. Forgay,47 U.S. (6 How.) at 203.
92. Id. at 203-04.
93. Id. at 204; WRIGHT, MILLER& COOPER, supra note 17, § 3910, at 307.
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fruition as a criterion of finality until the Court began to apply a practical
approach.94
b. Moses H. Cone and Quackenbush
Effective finality was largely limited to Forgay and its progeny for nearly
150 years until 1983, when the Supreme Court found effective finality in a
slightly different context in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury

Construction Corp.95 The hospital entered into a contract with a construction
contractor. 96 The contract specified that certain disagreements would first be
submitted to the architect, and his decisions, or disputes he failed to decide,
could be submitted for binding arbitration. 9 7 Although Mercury notified the
architect of its claims for delay and impact costs, the hospital filed suit in state
court instead, seeking a judicial declaration that Mercury had lost any right it
may have had to arbitration. 9 8 Mercury countered by filing suit in the district
court, seeking an order compelling arbitration. 99 On the hospital's motion, the
district court granted a stay (really an abstention under the Colorado River
doctrineloo) pending resolution of the state court action because the two cases
involved the identical issue of the arbitrability of Mercury's claims. 101
The Supreme Court held that the district court's stay order was final because
the appellant was "effectively out of court., 102 The Court went on to explain that
normally when a federal court abstains in favor of a state court action, the
expectation is that the federal action will resume if the plaintiff does not win
relief in the state forum.103 By contrast, the district court here based its stay on
the fact that the state court would also rule on the question of the arbitrability of
Mercury's claims.104 The Supreme Court concluded that the district court's
ruling was final and that it was an abuse of discretion. 105

94. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
95. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
96. Id. at 4.
97. Id. at 4-5.
98. Id. at 6-7.
99. Id. at 7.
100. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-21 (1976)
(holding that a federal court may, in its discretion, abstain from exercising jurisdiction where
duplicative litigation is underway in state court).
101. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 7.
102. Id. at 10 (quoting Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 n.2
(1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772, 774, 777-78
(5th Cir. 1961) (holding that an order denying the government's motion for a temporary restraining
order prohibiting a state court trial against a black man arrested for breach of the peace in the course
of registering voters was final because the practical effect of the district court's order was to moot
the government's civil rights case against the state).
103. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 10.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 10, 13-28. The Court also held, in the alternative, that the order was appealable
under the collateral order doctrine. Id. at 11-13.
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Thirteen years later, the Supreme Court extended its holding in Moses H
Cone to orders remanding (in addition to staying) cases based on abstention
doctrines.106 Concluding that Moses H. Cone controlled, the Supreme Court held
that "[t]he District Court's order remanding on grounds of Burford abstention
[was] in all relevant respects indistinguishable from the stay order [it] found to
be appealable in Moses H. Cone." 0 The Court noted that the order put the
plaintiffs "effectively out of court" 0 8 and that its effect, like the order in Moses
H Cone, was to "surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court." 109
Indeed, the Court explained that finality was even clearer in the case of a remand
because unlike a stay, "the district court disassociates itself from the case
entirely, retaining nothing of the matter on the federal court's docket." 10
c.

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States

A third variant on the theme of effective finality is found in Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States.1 1 Two companies agreed to merge, and the United States
sought to enjoin the merger under § 7 of the Clayton Act.1 12 The district court
agreed with the government and ordered the surviving corporation to refrain
from acquiring any further interest in the target corporation, to divest the target's
stock and assets, and to propose a plan for carrying out the divestiture order.113
The company appealed directly to the Supreme Court under the Expediting Act
of 1903.
At oral argument, the Court raised the issue of appellate jurisdiction,
observing that the district court had reserved a ruling on the specific plan for
implementation of the divestiture order. 115
The Court began its jurisdictional inquiry with broad language explaining
that "it ha[d] adopted essentially practical tests for identifying those jud ments
which [were], and those which [were] not, to be considered 'final."'"
The
Court continued, noting that "[a] pragmatic approach to the question of finality
ha[d] been considered essential to the achievement of the 'just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action': the touchstones of federal
procedure."

106. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 715 (1996) (citing Catlin v. United
States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)).
107. Id. at 714.
108. Id. (quotingMoses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 11 n. 11) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Id. (quotingMoses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 11 n. 11) (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Id.
111. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
112. Id. at 296.
113. Id. at 304.
114. Id. at 304-305 (citing Expediting Act of 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-82 § 2, 32 Stat. 823, 823
(1903) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 29 (2006)).
115. Id. at 305.
116. Id. at 306.
117. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
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The Court concluded that the district court's decree had "sufficient indicia of
finality" to vest the Court with appellate jurisdiction.!18 First, the Court noted
that because the company contended that no order of divestiture could have been
proper, the issues of how to carry out divestiture still pending before the district
court were "sufficiently independent of, and subordinate to, the issues presented
by [the] appeal."11 9 Because the question of how to carry out divestiture was
independent of whether the order compelling divestiture was correct, the Court's
conclusion that it was vested with appellate jurisdiction would not risk repetitive
consideration of the same question. 12 0 Second, the Court observed that
withholding review could impede implementation of the district court's
divestiture order because changing market conditions could make the order
"impractical or otherwise unenforceable."1 2 1 Finally, the Court noted that it had
recently taken jurisdiction in similar cases and that experience showed that
piecemeal appeals did not typically result.122
Thus, Brown Shoe Co. bridges, temporally and analytically, the reasoning in
Forgay and Moses H Cone.

Brown Shoe Co.'s holding that the lack of a

complete divestiture plan did not stand in the way of appellate jurisdiction
mirrors Forgay's holding that an accounting will not prevent jurisdiction where
the court has otherwise conclusively determined all claims as to all parties.
Brown Shoe Co.'s concern that the denial of review might impede the ability of
the divestiture plan to be executed foreshadowed the Court's similar holding in
Moses H Cone, namely, that finality exists where the effect of the order is to put
a party out of court.
Effective finality, therefore, comes in two varieties. First, there is the
Forgay-style order that resolves all claims against all parties but leaves some
technical or ministerial matter, "independent of, and subordinate to"123 the ruling
on the merits, to be done apart from the entry of judgment, where delay in
resolving the substantive issue would endanger the availability of the relief
sought. This reasoning has been employed to hold that a pending request for
attorney's fees or costs does not prevent the appealability of an otherwise final
order, so long as it would not moot or revise the underlying order.124 Second,
there is the Moses H Cone/Quackenbush-style order, which effectively puts a

party out of court or endangers the right to federal review of the claims and is

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Id
Id
Id
Id

at 308.
at 308-09.
at 309.
at 309-11.
at 308.

124. See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199, 202-03 (1988).
Amendments to the federal rules subsequently limited the scope of Budinich. See Glynn, supra note
4, at 192 n.60.
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therefore final, but which masquerades as an interlocutory order. 125 Brown Shoe
Co. employs some reasoning from both.
The broad language employed in Brown Shoe Co. also heralded a trend
prevalent throughout the 1960s and 1970s toward analyzing finality with a
greater eye on its effects on the parties.126 Brown Shoe Co.'s conclusion that
there were "sufficient indicia of finality" 127 signals the balancing aUroach the
Supreme Court would take in one contentious case two years later.
And its
strong language in support of a "pragmatic ap roach"129 prefigured the death
knell doctrine-the flagship of practical finality.
2.

PracticalFinality

The Supreme Court's practical interpretation of the final judgment rule
reached its zenith in what I call the "practical finality" cases. Unlike effective
finality, practical finality is derived from circumstances external to the order
sought to be reviewed-most often the ability or willingness of the appellant to
continue the litigation in the face of a devastating adverse interlocutory ruling
(i.e., an order that "sounds the death knell" of the action). The furthest the Court
ever took practical finality was a one-time endorsement of an ad hoc balancing
test.131 The Court has since repudiated the death knell doctrine and limited the
one case applying a balancing test to its facts.132 Although practical finality is no
longer a basis for invoking the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals,133 it provides
important context to any discussion suggesting further tinkering with the final
judgment rule.

125. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 10 (holding that an interlocutory stay order
effectively amounted to a "dismissal of the suit" for one of the parties and therefore was appealable
as a final judgment).
126. See, e.g., Ott v. Speedwriting Publ'g Co., 518 F.2d 1143, 1145-49 (6th Cir. 1975)
(analyzing whether an order denying a plaintiffs request to prosecute her case as a class action rises
to the level of a final order based on the practical effects to the plaintiff); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1966) ("Dismissal of the class action ... will irreparably harm
Eisen and all others similarly situated, for, as we have already noted, it will for all practical
purposes terminate the litigation.").
127. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 308.

128. Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964).
129. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 306.

130. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.a.
131. See Gillespie, 379 U.S. at, 152-53.
132. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 n.30 (1978) (citing Gillespie, 379 U.S.
at 154) ("[I]f Gillespie [was] extended beyond the unique facts of that case, § 1291 would be
stripped of all significance.").
133. Id. at 477; Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 439 (1985) (citing Coopers
& Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 473-75) (explaining that case-by-case determination of finality was in
conflict with 28 U.S.C. § 1291).
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The Death Knell Doctrine

A classic example of the death knell doctrine is a ruling denying class
certification where the claims of the individual class members are too small for
the case to proceed. For example, in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,134 the "sole
question presented [was] whether [the] appellant [could] take an appeal from an
order of the district court dismissing his class action, but permitting him to
litigate his individual claims."1 35 The Second Circuit concluded that "[t]he
alternatives [were] to appeal now or to end the lawsuit for all practical purposes
[because] . . . no lawyer of competence would] undertake this complex and
costly case to recover $70 for Mr. Eisen." 6 The court summarized its holding
by stating that "[w]here the effect of a district court's order, if not reviewed, is
the death knell of the action, review should be allowed." 137
The death knell doctrine, because it was predicated on a reckoning of the
improbability of further litigation, caused problems for courts attempting to
determine the certainty of an action's imminent demise. 138 A few circuits
rejected the doctrine entirely. 13 9 Judge Friendly called for intervention by the
Supreme Court. 140
In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,141 the Court resolved the circuit split,
disapproving of appellate jurisdiction under the death knell doctrine.142 In that
case, investors who had sustained a loss in the stock market sued, "on behalf of
themselves and . . . similarly situated purchasers," the corporation and the

accounting firm that had audited the corporation's prospectus.143 The district
court determined that the case could not be maintained as a class action, and the
investors filed a notice of appeal.144 The court of appeals, after concluding that
the individual claims would not be litigated, concluded that appellate jurisdiction
existed under the death knell doctrine and reversed the denial of class
certification.145 After noting that the parties' policy arguments were irrelevant,
the Supreme Court observed that, although class actions are a special type of
litigation, the rules governing class actions contained no special provisions for
appeals.146

134.
135.
136.
137.

370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966).
Id. at 119.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 121.

138. See Redish, supranote 5, at 97 n.57.

139. See, e.g., King v. Kan. City S. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 1259, 1260 (7th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam) (holding that an interlocutory order denying class action status was not appealable); Hackett
v. Gen. Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 625-26 (3d Cir. 1972) (same).
140. Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J., concurring).
141. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
142. See id. at 469-76.
143. Id. at 465.
144. Id. at 466.
145. Id. at 466-67 (citing Livesay v. Punta Gorda Isles, Inc., 550 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1977)).
146. Id. at 470.
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The Court reasoned that "if the 'death knell' doctrine ha[d] merit, it would
apply equally to . . . many interlocutory [rulings] in ordinary litigation . . . that

may have such tactical economic significance that a defeat is tantamount to a
'death knell' for the entire case." 14 The Court gave a litany of reasons for
rejecting the doctrine: (1) setting an amount-in-controversy requirement for
appellate jurisdiction was "a legislative, not a judicial, function" (and when it
depends on aggregated claims, it may depend on joinder decisions rather than
finality); (2) the doctrine is deleterious to the administration of justice because it
requires building a record regarding the factors relevant to the doctrine; (3) it
provides a potential avenue for successive appeals on the same issue; (4) "it
authorizes indiscriminate interlocutory review;" and (5) it "operates only in
favor of plaintiffs." 48 Thus, the Court held that where the litigation ends
because of the plaintiffs' response to the court's ruling, rather than because of
the ruling itself, the ruling cannot be final for purposes of appeal. 149
The petitioners in Coopers & Lybrand relied in part on an earlier decision in
Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 1o which suggested that a balancin
approach to finality might be appropriate under certain circumstances.
Gillespie has been roundly criticized as enfeebling the final judgment rule to the
point where it was unrecognizable, 1 52 and the Supreme Court in Coopers &
Lybrand limited Gillespie to its facts. 153
b.

Gillespie Balancing

In Gillespie, the plaintiff, the adminstratrix of her son's estate, sued her
deceased son's employer on behalf of herself and the decedent's siblings under
the Jones Act and general maritime law for negligence, wrongful death, and the
son's pain and suffering. 15 4 The district court determined that the Jones Act
supplied the exclusive remedy and struck all parts of the complaint that referred
to wrongful death under state law or to recovery for the decedents' siblings, who,
the court determined, were not "entitled to recovery under the Jones Act while

147. Id.
148. Id. at 472-74, 476.
149. See id. at 477.
150. 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
151. See id. at 152-53.
152. Nagel, supra note 20, at 204 n.27 (quoting Randall J. Turk, Note, Toward a More

Rational FinalJudgment Rule: A Proposalto Amend 28 U.S.C. § 1292, 67 GEo. L.J. 1025, 1034
(1979)); Redish, supra note 5, at 118, 128 (noting that "Gillespie is astounding for its clouded
reasoning and enigmatic conclusions" and "devoid of any persuasive analysis," but advocating for a
similar result).
153. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 477 n.30 ("If Gillespie were extended beyond the
unique facts of that case, § 1291 would be stripped of all significance.").
154. See Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 149-50 (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006) (originally enacted
as Jones Act, Pub. L. No. 66-261, § 20, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920)); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
2125.01, 2305.21 LexisNexis 2007).
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their mother was living."155 The mother immediately appealed, and the
Without
employer moved to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction.15
addressing the jurisdictional issue, the court of appeals addressed the merits and
affirmed the district court.157
The Supreme Court observed that finality is an elusive concept that has often
been given a practical construction.158 The Court noted the competing
considerations involved in determining whether an order is final for purposes of
appeal, including "the inconvenience ... of piecemeal review on the one hand
and the danger of denying justice by delay on the other." 159 The Court
acknowledged that the mode of proceeding by the court of appeals could [have
been] considered "piecemeal" but that "it [did] not appear that the inconvenience
and cost of trying [the] case [would] be greater."1 60 The Court therefore
concluded that it could not say that the court of appeals "chose wrongly under
the circumstances."1 61
Gillespie, therefore, appeared to countenance finality in "any situation in
which on balancing the competing practical factors a court [felt] it [was] in the
interests of justice to allow an interlocutory appeal." 62 Despite this seemingly
broad invitation to find finality where justice requires, the courts of appeals
never made much of Gillespie. 3 Some commentators believe Gillespie was an
attempt to articulate a standard by which the Supreme Court could review "the
merits of appeals ... mistakenly ... taken from nonfinal decisions."164
In any event, the Court later limited Gillespie to its facts.165 In addition to its
repudiation of practical finality in Coopers & Lybrand, it also clarified that:
In Gillespie, [it] upheld an exercise of appellate jurisdiction of what it
considered a marginally final order that disposed of an unsettled issue of
national significance because review of that issue unquestionably
"implemented the same policy Congress sought to promote in § 1292
(b)," and the arguable finality issue had not been presented to [the]
Court until argument on the merits, thereby ensuring that none of the

155. Id. at 150-51.
156. Id. at 151 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006)).
157. Id. at 151-52 (quoting Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 321 F.2d 518, 532 (6th Cir. 1963)).
158. See id. at 152 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46
(1949)).
159. Id. at 152-53 (quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511
(1950)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. Id. at 153 (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. Id.
162. Redish, supra note 5, at 119.
163. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 17, § 3913, at 479 ("Several other sources
underscore the failure to develop the expansionist possibilities of the Gillespie decision.")
(emphasis added).
164. Id. § 3913, at 484.
165. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 n.30 (1978).
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policies of judicial economy served by the finality requirement would be
achieved were the case sent back with the important issue undecided. 166
More succinctly, in Coopers & Lybrand the Court explained that
"[i]f Gillespie were extended beyond the unique facts of that case, § 1291 would
be stripped of all significance."1 7
Although Coopers & Lybrand definitively shut the door on practical finality
in the context of judicial exceptions to the final judgment rule, 16 the death knell
doctrine has recently made a resurgence as a major consideration in whether a
court of appeals will accept a discretionary appeal from an order granting or
denying class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f).169 The
definitiveness of Coopers & Lybrand, however, is not characteristic of finality
jurisprudence generally, nor of its most contentious and most litigated exceptions
in the partial effective finality cases.
3.

PartialEffective Finality

Partial effective finality is the most enigmatic corner of a cryptic area of law.
The Supreme Court first construed the final judgment rule to permit an appeal
from an order directing the clerk of court to produce documents to the grand jury
where the lower court's order was neither truly final nor effectively final as to all
parties and all claims. 170 Considerations of the effectiveness of a later appeal
and the tangential nature of the subject matter of the appeal to the underlying
action have prompted many courts to extend this holding to contempt orders
other than those against parties to civil proceedings. Courts have concluded that
partial effective finality may be sufficient to permit an appeal from a contempt
order where the order is independent of the underlying proceedings, the object of
the order is a tangential player in the underlying proceedings, or both.
Partial effective finality did not become a major player in finality
jurisprudence until the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen v. Beneficial
IndustrialLoan Corp.171 introduced what has come to be known as the collateral
order doctrine. 172 The doctrine is one of the most dominant fixtures on the

166. Id. (citation omitted).
167. Id.
168. See Glynn, supra note 4, at 194 ("[T]he death knell doctrine is undeniably dead.").
169. See, e.g., Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999)
(considering the death knell doctrine when ruling on whether to permit a Rule 23(f) appeal of a
district court order denying reconsideration of a class certification).
170. See Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 12-15 (1918). See generally Michael R.
Lazerwitz, Comment, The Perlman Exception: Limitations Required by the FinalDecision Rule, 49

U. CI. L. REv. 798 (1982) (explaining the implications of the Perlmanholding).
171. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
172. Id. at 546 ("This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally determine
claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be
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appellate jurisdiction landscape and is certainly the root of much of the recent
criticism of appellate jurisdiction generally. 73 After initial expansion of
appellate jurisdiction from the 1940s to the 1960s, the Court has restricted its
application since the mid-1980s. 174 This development, however, has clouded the
basic tenets of appellate jurisdiction.
a.

The PerlmanDoctrine

The Perlman doctrine permits immediate appeal by a non-party claiming a
privilege when the district court has denied the non-party's claim. 175 This
exception to the final judgment rule is narrow and lacking in clearly identified
bounds. 1 76 It does, however, remain a viable avenue to appellate review.177
Perlman was the inventor of a device called a demountable rim.178 He sued
a company for infringing his patent and won a judgment.179 During the trial, he
produced certain exhibits in support of his case. 180 After the case concluded,
Perlman formed the Perlman Rim Corporation and assigned his patent to it.
Some time later, the corporation sued a different company for infringing the
patent.182 Prior to trial, Perlman Rim Corporation moved to dismiss the action
without prejudice. 183 The court granted the motion on the condition that the
exhibits Perlman had produced in the earlier case be impounded in the custody
of the clerk.184 Thereafter, the U.S. Attorney sought access to the exhibits in his
investigation of Perlman personally for possible crimes against the United
States. 5 Perlman filed for an injunction against the government on the grounds
that turning over possibly incriminating evidence without his consent infringed
his rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, but the court denied relief. 8 6

denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be
deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.").
173. See Steinman, supra note 2, at 1238-39.
174. See Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine:A New "Serbonian Bog" and
Four Proposalsfor Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REv. 539, 540 (1998) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511 (1985)) ("Beginning in the early 1960s, however, the Court began the process of
expanding the collateral order doctrine, culminating in the 1985 decision of Mitchell v. Forsyth.");
Glynn, supra note 4, at 206 n.120 ("Indeed, Mitchell marked both the high point and the end of a
period of expansive use of the doctrine.").
175. Lazerwitz, supra note 170, at 798.
176. See id. at 802-03.
177. See id. at 798.
178. Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 8 (1918).
179. Id. (citing Perlman v. Standard Welding Co., 231 F. 453, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1915)).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 9.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 10-11.
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Perlman appealed, and the government moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of
appellate jurisdiction.187
The Supreme Court found the government's position that the lower court's
order was not final "somewhat strange."188 The Court noted that the
government's contention, if accepted, would mean "that Perlman was powerless
to avert the mischief of the order but must accept its incidence and seek a remedy
at some other time and in some other way." 189 The Court also noted that
Perlman's request for injunctive relief was "independent" of the underlying
proceedings.
Courts have discerned two bases for applying the Perlman doctrine to allow
immediate appeal from the rejection of a non-party's claim of privilege. First,
the order is effectively final as to the non-party because he is "powerless to
prevent compliance with the order." 191 Unlike a party, a non-party has no option
to prevent compliance by disobeying the order and risking contempt.192 Doing
so would both avert the mischief and enable an appellate court to review the
propriety of the lower court's decision. 193 Second, the non-party's claim
"is a
1 94
'collateral matter' . . . 'distinct from the general subject of the litigation."'
b.

Contempt

The idea that partial effective finality may support appellate jurisdiction
where the court resolves all claims against a particular party (or non-party), or
where the issues resolved are collateral to the underlying merits of the litigation,
took greater shape and definition in the contempt cases. Contempt proceedings,
like other litigation, are divided into criminal and civil sides. Criminal contempt
consists of sanctions imposed to "vindicate the court's authority and punish
disobedience." Civil contempt, by contrast, is "designed to coerce compliance
for the benefit of an opposing party or provide compensation for injuries arising
from past disobedience." 19
The distinction is crucial because appellate
jurisdiction of appeals from contempt sanctions may turn on the nature of the

187. Id. at 12.

188. Id. at 12-13.
189. Id. at 13.
190. Id. at 12.

191. Glynn, supra note 4, at 191 n.56.
192. Id. The Court has similarly suggested that the impossibility of later review is a basis for
the doctrine, see United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States, 309
U.S. 323, 324, 328-29 (1940), but contempt itself is a means to gain appellate review, Alexander v.
United States, 201 U.S. 117, 121-22 (1906), so these reasons are not analytically distinct.
193. See Lazerwitz, supra note 170, at 801 (citing Perlman, 247 U.S. at 13).
194. Glynn, supra note 4, at 191 n.56.
195. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER,supra note 17,
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sanction imposed.196 In addition, an order may be final as to197
a particular person
where the person is not a party to the underlying proceedings.
i.

Non-PartyContemnors

The Supreme Court, in Bessette v. WB. Conkey Co.,198 first held that a nonparty can appeal a contempt adjudication where the underlying proceedings have
become final. 199 The Court, however, went out of its way to explain that had
there been an appeal from the underlying case it would not have brought up the
contempt order because the contemnor was a non-party. 200 Because the order
was final as to the non-party, it "[could not] be regarded as interlocutory."2 01
The Court applied the dicta in Bessette that criminal contempt orders against
non-parties are final decisions when it held in Lamb v. Cramer202 that a non-party
can appeal from a civil contempt order.203 In Lamb, the Court reasoned that the
contempt order was a final adjudication of the rights asserted and that it was
independent of the underlying proceedings.204 But it was not until 1988 that the
Court put the two together and conclusively held that "[t]he right of a nonparty to
appeal an adjudication of contempt cannot be questioned. The order finding a
nonparty witness in contempt is appealable notwithstanding the absence of a final
judgment in the underlying action. 205
ii. Party Contemnors

The appealability of contempt orders against parties has undergone a
different evolution. First, in In re Christensen Engineering Co.,206 the Court
extended Bessette to hold that a criminal contempt citation is immediate
appealable regardless of whether it is directed against a party or a non-party.2

196. See id. § 3917, at 379.
197. See id.§ 3917, at 383.
198. 194 U.S. 324 (1904).
199. Id. at 338.
200. Id. at 329-30.
201. Id. Partial effective finality as to parties has been applied in contexts other than
contempt. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 513 (1950) ("[I]t is
hard to see why the exclusion of an intervenor from the case should be less final when it is based
upon the evidence than when it is based upon pleadings. In either case, the lawsuit is all over so far
as the intervenor is concerned.").
202. 285 U.S. 217 (1932).
203. See id.
at 220-21.
204. Id.
205. U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76 (1988)
(citing United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323,
328 (1940)).
206. 194 U.S. 458 (1904).
207. Id. at 461; see also Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 121 (1906) ("In a certain
sense finality can be asserted of the orders under review, so, in a certain sense, finality can be
asserted of any order of a court. And such an order may coerce a witness, leaving to him no
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Civil contempt orders against parties are treated differently and are the only
category of contempt order that is not independently appealable. 208 The Court
first held that the right to review of criminal contempt citations was derived from
the statute conferring appellate jurisdiction over criminal matters generally.209
There being no equivalent authority in the civil context, the Court held that
review of a civil contempt order must await final judgment.210
The contempt cases illustrate two bases for partial effective finality. First,
the cases establish that criminal contempt is alway appealable because that issue
is independent of the underlying litigation.
As a corollary of that
independence, an appeal from the underlying litigation would not bring up the
contempt order, so awaiting final judgment would not enable later review.212
Contempt orders against non-parties, whether civil or criminal, are similarly
final. 2 13 In those cases, finality exists as to the non-party contemnor because the
contemnor is not sufficiently connected to the parties in the underlying
litigation. 214 Thus, a contempt decree is final unless it is both tied up with the
merits of the underlying litigation and reviewable on appeal of the final
judgment on the merits-a situation present only with regard to civil contempt
sanctions against a party to the underlying proceeding. 215
Although the special treatment of civil contempt of parties has been
criticized, the Court's identification of separate parties and separate issues as
indicative of finality is typical of the Court's partial effective finality
jurisprudence. As under the Perlman doctrine, contempt orders, although not
effectively final, may be partially effectively final because the issues are
collateral to the underlying litigation, either because of the nature of the
proceedings or because of the relation of the contemnor to those proceedings. 217

alternative but to obey or be punished. It may have the effect and the same characteristic of finality
as the orders under review, but from such a ruling it will not be contended there is an appeal. Let
the court go further and punish the witness for contempt of its order, then arrives a right of review
208. See generally Doyle v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 204 U.S. 599, 603-04, 607
(1907) (citing Christensen, 194 U.S. 458) (indicating that civil contempt proceedings against nonparties and all criminal contempt orders are immediately appealable, but that civil contempt orders
against parties are only appealable upon the court entering a final decree in the underlying action).
209. Id. at 604.
210. Id. at 608; Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105, 107 (1936) ("The rule is settled in this Court
that except in connection with an appeal from a final judgment or decree, a party to a suit may not
review upon appeal an order fining or imprisoning him for the commission of a civil contempt.").
211. See Petroleos Mexicanos v. Crawford Enters., Inc., 826 F.2d 392, 398 (5th Cir. 1987);
Glynn, supra note 4, at 190 n.55.
212. See Glynn, supra note 4, at 190 n.55.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See Joan Meier, The "Right" to a Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal Contempt:
UnpackingPublic and PrivateInterests, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 85, 92-99 (1992).
217. See Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 12-13 (1918).
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Partial effective finality, however, is expressed most dramatically in the
collateral order doctrine.
c.

The CollateralOrderDoctrine

The genesis of the most important judicially-crafted exception to the final
judgment rule is the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp.218 The Cohen Court held that § 1291 did not prevent immediate
review of rulings that "finally determine claims of right separable from, and
collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and
too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be
deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." 219 Determining what classes of
orders fall within this definition has been one of the most often addressed issues
by the Supreme Court by the last half-century.22 0
ShortlK after the Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 21 Sol Cohen, a shareholder in the Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corporation, brought a derivative action in federal court against the
corporation's officers and directors under the court's diversity jurisdiction.222
The company moved to require Cohen to post security to pay the costs of
defense if he lost, as required under New Jersey law.223 The district court denied
the motion, concluding that a federal court was not bound to apply the state law
security requirement. 224 The corporation appealed, 225 and the Third Circuit, after
concluding that, under Erie, the underlying order was appealable, reversed on the
merits. 226 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on both the appealability of the
district court's order and on the application of the state law security
requirement.227
The Court held that although the appellate function is one of review and not
intervention, "the [d]istrict [c]ourt's action upon this application was concluded
and closed and its decision final in that sense before the appeal was taken." 228
The Court explained that the district court's order

218. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
219. Id. at 546.
220. See Glynn, supra note 4, at 204 ("[T]he collateral order doctrine and mandamus review
have had the most troubled history."); Steinman, supra note 2, app. at 1296-97 (listing forty-two
Supreme Court cases addressing the issue of appellate jurisdiction from 1980 to 2007).
221. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
222. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 543; Anderson, supra note 174, at 543 (citing Cohen, 337 U.S. at 543;
Erie, 304 U.S. 64). After Sol's death, his widow, Hannah, prosecuted the action as the executrix of
his estate. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. v. Smith, 170 F.2d 44, 47 (3d Cir. 1948).
223. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 544-45.
224. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 7 F.R.D. 352, 354-55 (1947).
225. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545.
226. BeneficialIndus. Loan Corp., 170 F.2d at 49-50, 59.
227. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 543, 545.
228. Id. at 546.
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did not make any step toward final disposition of the merits of the case
and [would] not be merged in final judgment. When that time [came], it
[would] be too late effectively to review the present order, and the rights
conferred by the statute, if it [was] applicable, [would] have been lost,
probably irreparably.22 9
Thus, where the particular issue decided by the district court was conclusive
as to that issue and was not a step toward the final judgment, and where later
review would be unavailing, appellate jurisdiction attached. The Court
summarized its holding by stating that the case "appear[ed] to fall in that small
class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to,
rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too
independent of the cause itself to re uire that appellate consideration be deferred
until the whole case is adjudicated." o
Applying this standard has not resulted in a uniform body of law.231 Indeed,
even the standard itself has undergone change over the years.
Instead of linear
development, the collateral order doctrine has been formed by successive waves
of expansion and contraction.233 The overlapping and doctrinally discordant
precedent that resulted from this process has led many commentators, and at
least one Justice, to call for change. 234 Recently, the Court's jurisprudence has
made application of the doctrine more predictable,235 but its new, narrow
interpretation comes at the expense of distancing the doctrine from the logic
underlying the other types of effective finality.
i.

The Early Confusion: A Failureto Explain and Define

Scholars disagree on the breadth of the Supreme Court's early aplication of
the collateral order doctrine, calling it both "liberal" and "narrow."
What is

229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See Anderson, supra note 174, at 547.
232. Id. at 548-85 (chronicling the early construction of the collateral order doctrine and its
later expansion).
233. See id. at 551.

234. E.g., Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 292 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("I do think ... that our finality jurisprudence is sorely in need of further
limiting principles, so that Cohen appeals will be, as we originally announced they would be, a
'small class [of decisions] ... too important to be denied review." (alteration in original) (quoting
Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546)), supersededby statute, Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L 101-650,
104 Stat. 5089; Anderson, supra note 174, at 606-14 (proposing four remedies to the problems
associated with application of the collateral order doctrine).
235. See Glynn, supra note 4, at 209.
236. Compare Anderson, supra note 174, at 548 ("For the first decade and a half following
Cohen, the Supreme Court appeared to adhere to a narrow, mootness-based formulation .... ), with
Martineau, supra note 36, at 740 ("For two decades the Supreme Court did not interfere with the
liberal use of the collateral order doctrine.").
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certain is that in the years following the birth of the doctrine, the Court paid little
attention to fleshing out its component parts,2 37 and the requirement that the
order in question be "too important to be denied review" was largely ignored.238
Several early cases focused on the ineffectiveness of later review. In Swift & Co.
Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe,239 the plaintiff was granted an
order attaching the defendant's ship.240 "The district court vacated the
attachment for lack of jurisdiction," and the plaintiff appealed. 24 1 The Supreme
Court held that the district court's order was appealable under Cohen because of
the likelihood that a later appeal would be ineffective after the ship had sailed
and left American waters.
Similarly, in Stack v. Boyle,243 the Court held that a
challenge to bail as excessive under the Eighth Amendment was appealable
under the collateral order doctrine.244
Lloyd Anderson has suggested that these cases, together with the question of
pretrial security at issue in Cohen, demonstrate that the collateral order doctrine
is substantially premised on mootness. 245 Anderson sees the possibility of the
court being unable to provide a remedy as the main criterion for determining
whether a given order can effectively be reviewed on appeal from a true final
judgment and, thus, whether the doctrine applies. 246 A court cannot attach a ship
once it has left the jurisdiction;247 pretrial bail cannot be reduced after a
defendant is sentenced;248 and security for ongoing litigation is useless after the
249
litigation has ended.
Mootness is relevant, to be sure, but there is a great deal of uncertainty
surrounding the question of what effective reviewability entails. The collateral

237. See Anderson, supra note 174, at 548 (noting that the Court "fail[ed] to be explicit" about
the formulation of the doctrine).
238. Martineau, supra note 36, at 740 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 546 (1949)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that the Court "largely ignored"
the "serious and unsettled question" prong of the test announced in Cohen (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
239. 339 U.S. 684 (1950).
240. Id. at 685-86. Maritime attachment is a feature of admiralty law that permits a court to
gain jurisdiction over an absent defendant and to assure satisfaction of judgment (up to the value of
the vessel) by authorizing the marshal to take custody of the vessel during the pendency of
proceedings. See FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. E; ProShipLine, Inc. v. Aspen Infrastructures, Ltd., 585
F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Aqua Stoli Shipping Ltd. v. Gardner Smith Pty Ltd., 460 F.3d
434, 437, 443 (2d Cir. 2006)).
241. Anderson, supra note 174, at 548 (citing Swift, 339 U.S. at 687-88).
242. Swift, 339 U.S. at 688-89.
243. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
244. See id. at 6-7 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47
(1949)).
245. See Anderson, supra note 174, at 548-49 (citing Stack, 342 U.S. at 6-7, 12 (Jackson, J.,
concurring); Swift, 339 U.S. at 686-87, 689).
246. Id. at 549.
247. Id. at 548 (citing Swift, 339 U.S. at 689).
248. Id. at 549 (citing Stack, 342 U.S. at 6-7, 12 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
249. Id. at 544 (citing Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546).
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order doctrine did not develop in isolation, and its development must be viewed
with an eye to the greater context of appellate jurisdiction generally. There are
several reasons to think that the Court did not intend Cohen to apply only in
situations where the denial of appellate jurisdiction would moot the relief sought.
First, other instances of partial effective finality are split on the question of
whether the ineffectiveness of later review is a necessary prerequisite to
interlocutory review. The Perlman doctrine appears to require it; appeals of
contempt citations do not. Contemporaneous application of similar doctrines
therefore shed little light on the question. Second, it seems likely that the Court
would want to shore up its new, practical construction of the final judgment rule
with relatively straightforward cases where firm analogies to other permissible
interlocutory appeals could be drawn before proceeding to extend a new doctrine
into new territory. Third, new rules typically do not emerge with their final
limitations in place. Instead, future cases and future courts are left to make those
determinations in the usual way common law is made. Indeed, it is generally
thought improper for a court to decide more than the case before it actually
requires. The Court's early decisions applying the collateral order doctrine left it
open-ended for possible further expansion and much needed clarification.
ii. The Middle Confusion: Expansion, Contraction, and the
Growing Distancefrom Other Doctrines ofFinality

From the early 1960s to the late 1970s the collateral order doctrine
underwent significant development. Two themes from this period stand out.
First, whatever connection the doctrine had to the other judicially-created
exceptions largely disappeared. Second, the requirement that an order be
effectively unreviewable after final judgment on the merits was significantly
weakened. Effective unreviewability no longer meant a reasonable probability
of mootness (if it ever was so limited); when the requirement was enforced at all,
it encompassed a broader spectrum of orders.
Local No. 438 Construction & General Laborers' Union v. Curry5 0

illustrates both of these trends.251 In Curry, an employer sued a union in state
court for violating a state right-to-work law and requested a temporary injunction
against picketing. 52 The union responded that the state court lacked jurisdiction
because the dispute was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board.253 The state court denied the injunction, the state high court

250. 371 U.S. 542 (1963).
251. Curry involves Supreme Court review of a state court decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
Id. at 543. Finality in this context involves concerns separate from those present regarding finality
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and has grown differently in some respects on account of those differences.
See supranote 40.
252. Curry, 371 U.S. at 544.
253. See id. at 543.
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254

reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Court held that the
state supreme court's decision was appealable under Cohen because the state
court's decision was effectively final and because the issue of the state court's
jurisdiction was separate from the merits.255
Curry is notable in two respects. First, the Court relied on Cohen for a
decision that could have more comfortably fit under the rationale of Forgay.256
Indeed, it is difficult to distinguish the facts of Curry from the Court's later
decisions in Moses H. Cone257 and Quackenbush.258 In all three, an interlocutory

order had the possibility of mooting the relief sought. Forgay, of course,
concerned finality when ministerial matters remained to be completed, 2 5 9 but the
facts of Curry seem to fit more precisely with the overall notion of effective
finality than with the collateral order doctrine.
In order to make the collateral order doctrine work in Curry, the Court had
to (1) ignore the requirement that later review be ineffectual and (2) weaken the
separability requirement to the point where questions of jurisdiction are separate
from the merits.26 Justice Harlan concurred but noted his disagreement that
jurisdiction was sufficiently separate from the merits to be reviewable.261 Justice
Harlan explained that jurisdiction merges in the final judgment and that it
therefore is reviewable on appeal from a true final judgment.
I will return to
the question of jurisdiction merging in the final judgment in Part III. For now, it
is sufficient to note that rather than rely primarily on Forgay where it might have
made better use of the case, the Court instead stretched the collateral order
doctrine, as Justice Harlan put it, "to the breaking point."263
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,264 the Court added to the confusion it
began in Curry's uneasy application of the doctrine by ignoring the question of
unreviewability. The district court ruled in Eisen that not every member of a
Rule 23(b)(3) class needed to be notified of the action; the court specified how
notice was to be given and ordered the defendants to pay ninety percent of the
cost. 26 5 The Court concluded that the order requiring the defendants to pay

254. Id. (citing Curry v. Constr. & Gen. Laborers Union Local No. 438, 123 S.E. 2d 653 (Ga.
1962)).
255. Id. at 548-49 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)).
256. The Court cited Forgayin a footnote but did not distinguish between the various methods
of determining finality. See id. at 549 n.6 (citing Carondelet Canal & Navigation Co. v. Louisiana,
233 U.S. 362 (1914); Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848)).
257. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
258. 517 U.S. 706 (1996).
259. Forgay,47 U.S. at 204.
260. See Anderson, supra note 174, at 552 (citing Curry, 371 U.S. at 553-54 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
261. Curry, 371 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., concurring).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 554 (Harlan, J., concurring).
264. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
265. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

29

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 4

382

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 62: 3 53

ninety percent of the cost was appealable under the collateral order doctrine.266
Like Curry, Eisen diluted the doctrine's requirements as they had been
established in earlier cases. 2 67 The decision does not mention unreviewability.
Anderson suggests that "Eisen can be interpreted as dropping the requirement
altogether, leaving only a two-part test: ( a conclusive determination of an
issue that is (2) separate from the merits."
Furthermore, he suggests that like
in Gillespie, ad hoc balancing may be a significant element of the Court's
rationale.269
And like the Court's swift retreat from Gillespie, Eisen did not hold sway for
long. Three years later, in Abney v. United States,2 7 0 the Court returned to a
doctrinal formulation that included an element of irreparability. 271 The
government charged Abney with a federal crime.272 After Abney's conviction,
the court of appeals ordered a new trial.273 Abney objected that a new trial
would violate the Fifth Amendment prohibition on double jeopardy.274 The
Court held that the denial of the motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds
was appealable as a collateral order.2 7 5 This time, the Court announced three
standards that must be satisfied for appellate jurisdiction to attach under Cohen:
the order must be a final rejection of the claim, the issue must be completely
separate from the merits, and the order must involve "an important right which
would be 'lost, probably irreparably,' if review had to await final judgment.' 2 76
The Court observed first that the district court's rejection of Abney's motion to
277
dismiss was a final determination.
Next, the Court noted that the double
jeopardy claim was collateral to the merits because "he [was] contesting the very
authority of the Government to hale him into court to face trial on the charge
against him," and that claim was "completely independent of his guilt or
innocence." 278 Finally, the Court explained that later appellate review would be
ineffectual because the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on double jeopardy
protected a defendant not just against a second punishment for the same crime,

266. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 171-72.
267. See Anderson, supra note 174, at 555.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
271. Anderson, supra note 174, at 556 (citing Abney, 431 U.S. at 658-59).
272. Abney, 431 U.S. at 653 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006)).
273. Id. at 655 (citing United Stated v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1975)).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 659.
276. Id. at 658 (quoting and citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 54647 (1949)).
277. Id. at 659 ("There are simply no further steps that can be taken in the District Court to
avoid the trial the defendant maintains is barred by the Fifth Amendment's guarantee. Hence,
Cohen's threshold requirement of a fully consummated decision is satisfied.").
278. Id. at 659-60 (citing Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975); Blackledge v. Perry, 417
U.S. 21, 30 (1974); Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 509 (1973)).
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but against a second trial as well.279 Vindication of that right after the trial had
taken place would not provide relief.280
The following year, the Court crystallized the standard for appellate
jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. In Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay,281 the district court refused to certify a class under Rule 23.282 The
Court held that the denial of class certification met none of the requirements for
appealability under Cohen.283 First, the Court explained that class certification is
inherently tentative and, under Rule 23(c)(1), may be revised at any time. 284
Thus, the district court's ruling was not a final decision on the issue.28 Second,
the Court reasoned that certification, rather than being completely separate from
the merits, is necessarily "enmeshed" with them. 286 Finally, the Court
determined that the order "[was] subject to effective review after final judgment"
because the named plaintiffs could raise the denial of class certification on
appeal from a final judgment.287 The Coopers formulation of the Cohen
standard continues to hold sway; the Abney interpretation of the irreparability
requirement-that assertion of a right not to be tried is sufficient-has had the
single most important influence on the development of the collateral order
doctrine over the last thirty years and has led to what some commentators have
seen as an increasing internal consistency. 288
iii. The Recent Confusion: Immunity and Otherwise

Abney's identification of the double jeopardy clause as a defense that could
be appealed under the collateral order doctrine spawned a line of cases
concluding that immunities from suit that encompass a right not to be tried are
immediately appealable. In addition to double jeopardy immunity, between
1979 and 2007 the Supreme Court held that claims of state sovereign
immunity,289 executive immunity,290 immunity under the Speech or Debate

279. Id at 660.
280. Id at 662.
281. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
282. Id at 464-66.
283. Id at 468-69.
284. Id at 469 & n.Il (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)).
285. See id. at 468-69.
286. Id at 469 (quoting Mercantile Nat'1 Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
287. Id (citing United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 386 (1977)).
288. See Glynn, supra note 4, at 211-13.
289. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 147 (1993)
("We hold that States and state entities ... may take advantage of the collateral order doctrine to
appeal ... [an] order denying a claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity.").
290. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 743 (1982) ("[W]e conclude that [the issue of
Presidential immunity] present[s] a 'serious and unsettled' and therefore appealable question to the
Court of Appeals.").

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

31

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 4

384

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 62: 3 53

clause,291 qualified immunity,292 and immunity under the Westfall Ace 93 all fell
under the collateral order doctrine. Indeed, the only substantial departure during
this period from the Court's apparent unwillingness to classify anything other
than an immunity order as collateral was the Court's 2003 decision, over a
vigorous dissent, concluding that an order directing a criminal defendant to be
involuntarily medicated was collateral.294
Nearly all other orders presented to the Court during this period were
excluded from the collateral order club. For instance, the Court held that
motions to dismiss on grounds other than immunity are not collateral because a
right to dismissal is not necessarily a right not to stand trial; failure of the district
court to dismiss a case that does not involve an immunity from trial can be
corrected on appeal after a final judgment.295 In another set of cases, the Court
concluded that the conduct of attorneys generally does not result in a collateral
order. 296

291. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 508 (1979) ("We hold that if Helstoski wished to
challenge the District Court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment [under the Speech or
Debate Clause], direct appeal to the Court of Appeals was the proper course . . . .").
292. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) ("[W]e hold that a district court's
denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an
appealable 'final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1291 notwithstanding the absence of a
final judgment."). But see Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1995) ("[W]e hold that a
defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a district court's
summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets
forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial.").
293. See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 239 (2007) ("Tellingly, the Courts of Appeals are
unanimous in holding that orders denying Westfall Act certification and substitution are amenable
to immediate review under Cohen. We confirm that the Courts of Appeals have ruled correctly on
this matter." (citations omitted)).
294. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 177 (2003) ("We add that the question presented
here, whether Sell has a legal right to avoid forced medication, . . . differs from the question
whether forced medication did make a trial unfair. . . . An ordinary appeal comes too late for a
defendant to enforce the first right; an ordinary appeal permits vindication of the second. We
conclude that the District Court order from which Sell appealed was an appealable 'collateral
order."').
295. See Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 496 (1989) (holding that an interlocutory
order denying dismissal of a damages claim based on a forum selection clause was not immediately
appealable as a collateral order); Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 795, 802
(1989) (holding that an order denying a criminal defendant's dismissal motion for alleged Rule 6(e)
violations was not immediately appealable); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 527 (1988)
(holding that an order denying a motion to dismiss based on forum inconvenience was "not
immediately appealable as of right"); United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263,
264, 270 (1982) (per curiam) (holding that an interlocutory order refusing a motion to dismiss for
prosecutorial vindictiveness was not immediately appealable).
296. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 609 (2009) ("[T]he collateral order
doctrine does not extend to disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege. Effective
appellate review can be had by other means."); Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., 527 U.S. 198, 210
(1999) ("[W]e conclude that a sanctions order imposed on an attorney is not a 'final decision' under
§ 1291 . . . ."); Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 440 (1985) ("We hold that orders
disqualifying counsel in civil cases ... are not collateral orders subject to appeal as 'final judgments
. . . ."); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 269 (1984) ("[A] disqualification order does not
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Mitchell v. Forsyth,297 which held that denial of qualified immunity on a
298
question of law is collateral, is undoubtedly the most important of the group
both because it is employed far more frequently than any other type of
immunity299 and because the Court adjusted the separability requirement.
Qualified immunity concerns whether the defendant violated a clearly
established right and whether a reasonable person would have known the person
was violating that right.300 Accordingly, it is not "completely separate from the
merits."30 1 Instead, the Court concluded that the question of immunity was
"conceptually distinct from the merits."302 The Court did not provide further
guidance on what constituted conceptual distinction and has yet to do so.
As it was happening, the Court's collateral order jurisprudence was difficult
to discern and prompted much criticism.303 But now, as the Court appears
increasingly close to settling the doctrine, and notwithstanding Mitchell's
"conceptually distinct" factor, the Court appears to be applying the collateral
order doctrine in a predictable and uniform manner. 304 Timothy Glynn, writing
in 2001, identified circuit splits over application of the doctrine in only three
situations: "orders rejecting protection for allegedly privileged attorney-client
communications; orders refusing protection for claimed trade secrets; and orders
denying the appointment of counsel."305 In 2009, the Court resolved the first
circuit split, holding that such orders are not collateral, 306 and cast significant
doubt on the second. 307 Since Abney, the Court has essentially concluded that
immunities from suit are collateral, but very little else.
One, perhaps unintended, consequence of the Court's recent limitation of the
doctrine to immunity defenses is an uncertainty surrounding the sometimes-used
requirement that the right asserted be important. Cohen itself suggested that the

qualify as an immediately appealable collateral order in a straight forward application of the
necessary conditions laid down in prior cases."); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S.
368, 379 (1981) ("[An] order denying a motion to disqualify counsel is not appealable under § 1291
prior to final judgment in the underlying litigation.").
297. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
298. Id. at 530.
299. See Anderson, supra note 174, at 571 (noting that civil rights cases against public
officials for violation of federal rights constitute "one of the largest elements of the federal civil
caseload").
300. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526-28.
301. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (citing United States v.
MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 855 (1978); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977)).
302. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527-28 (citing Abney, 431 U.S. at 659-60).
303. See Anderson, supra note 174, at 585; Glynn, supra note 4, at 204 n.112; Steinman,
supranote 2, at 1238-39.
304. Glynn, supra note 4, at 205, 209 (noting that "criticism may have been warranted a
decade ago, but the collateral order doctrine is now both coherent and easy to apply" and that
"despite . . . a few remaining, unresolved issues, the collateral order doctrine has emerged as a
relatively clear and well-defined exception that leads to predictable results.").
305. Id. at 215-16 (citations omitted).
306. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 609 (2009).
307. See Glynn, supra note 4, at 216 & n.158.
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question presented must be "too important to be denied review," 308 and the
question presented in Cohen concerning application of the Erie doctrine suggests
that the circumstances of the case, rather than the category of order, might be
relevant in the evaluation of the question's importance. 30 In most cases, though,
importance was an afterthought-too malleable to apply coherently to a doctrine
not in need of further complication. In cases denying ap ealability, the court
might add a lack of importance as a further reason to deny.
In cases allowing
an appeal, the Court often simply ignored it.311
Beginning in the early 1990s, the Court relied on the importance
requirement for a new purpose: not as an independent factor in determining
appealability, but to assist in ascertaining, under Abney, what rights include a
right not to stand trial. 312 Ultimately, this interpretation proved unworkable, and
after the Court refined Abney's right not to stand trial to "mean an immunity
from suit rather than a mere defense to liability," 313 the importance factor faded
again into the background. 314 It now serves chiefly as a reminder of the
difficulties the Court has faced in trying to implement the doctrine.315

308. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
309. See Anderson, supra note 174, at 547. The Cohen opinion is unclear on this point. Id.
The Court indicates that not all orders fixing security are subject to interlocutory review but does
not thoroughly explain why. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 547. The best reading may be that Cohen
concerned a conclusive question of law and distinguished the more common challenge to tentative
and discretionary orders setting the amount of money necessary to secure the opposing party. See
id.
310. See, e.g., Atl. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d
371, 378 (11th Cir. 1989) ("Publication of the memorandum order does not constitute an issue of
sufficient import to warrant disruptive interlocutory review.").
311. See Glynn, supra note 4, at 208 n.131.
312. See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 878-79 (1994)
("Digital may validly question whether 'importance' is a factor 'beyond' the three Cohen conditions
or whether it is best considered . . . in connection with the second, 'separability,' requirement ...
but neither enquiry could lead to the conclusion that 'importance' is itself unimportant. To the
contrary, the third Cohen question, whether a right is 'adequately vindicable' or 'effectively
reviewable,' simply cannot be answered without a judgment about the value of the interests that
would be lost through rigorous application of a final judgment requirement."); P.R. Aqueduct &
Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146-47 (1993) (noting that the collateral order
doctrine's "ultimate justification is the importance of ensuring that the States' dignitary interests can
be fully vindicated"); Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); Abney v. United
States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949))
("While it is true . . . that the 'right not to be sued elsewhere than in Naples' is not fully
vindicated-indeed, to be utterly frank, is positively destroyed-by permitting the trial to occur and
reversing its outcome, that is vindication enough because the right is not sufficiently important to
overcome the policies militating against interlocutory appeals.").
313. Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
314. Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., 527 U.S. 198, 203-10 (1999).
315. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 610 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (opining that the Court should not apply the
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B. Appellate Mandamus

If the collateral order doctrine is the most significant exception to the final
judgment rule, appellate mandamus is the clear runner-up. Mandamus, one of
the traditional common law prerogative writs, is generally employed to order a
public official to perform some nondiscretionary function in connection with his
office where the party aggrieved has no alternative recourse. 316 Perhaps most
famously, mandamus was the tactic William Marbury employed in his endeavor
to compel then-Secretary of State James Madison to deliver his commission as a
317
Federal courts of appeals also use the writ as a means to
justice of the peace.
confine district courts to their prescribed jurisdiction. 3 18 The mandamus power,
however, is also used to review a broad array of interlocutory orders that are not
appealable under an effective finality or partial effective finality construction of
§ 1291 .319 Although appellate mandamus has a longer history in the federal
courts than the standard common law variety employed against executive
officers, it is a significant departure from the original scope and purpose of the
writ, and its use as a means to review substantive decisions of district courts,
even if consonant with the governing statute, makes little sense in the context of
finality generally.
At common law, the writ of mandamus issued from the Court of King's
Bench to inferior courts "requiring them to do some particular thing 'which the
King's Bench ha[d] previously determined, or, at least suppose[d] to be
consonant to right and justice."' 3 2 0 Although several writs contained the word
"mandamus" ("we command"), the ancestor of what is now known as the writ of
mandamus developed in the early seventeenth century as a means for the King's
Bench to superintend inferior authorities in the boroughs and cities.32 1 In the
words of the Supreme Court:
It is a writ, in England, issuing out of the king's bench, in the name of
the king, and is called a prerogative writ, but considered a writ of right;

Cohen doctrine because it "needlessly perpetuates a judicial policy that [the Court] for many years
[has] criticized and struggled to limit").
316. See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 614 (1838); Note,
Developments in the Law: Remedies Against the UnitedStates andIts Officials, 70 HARV. L. REV.

827, 846-47 (1957).
317. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 137-38 (1803).
318. See, e.g., Exparte Simons, 247 U.S. 231, 240 (1918) ("[A]s the order may be regarded as
having repudiated jurisdiction of the first count, mandamus may be adopted to require the District
Court to produce and to give the plaintiff her right to a trial at common law.").
319. See, e.g., Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 607 (citing Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367,
390 (2004)) ("[A]ttorneys and clients ... would find that litigants confronted with a particularly
injurious or novel privilege ruling have several potential avenues of review apart from collateral
order appeal.

..

. [I]n extraordinary circumstances . .. a party may petition the court of appeals for

a writ of mandamus.").
320. Crick, supra note 19, at 554 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 110).
321. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 147 (4th ed. 2002).
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and is directed to some person, corporation or inferior court, requiring
them to do some particular thing, therein specified, which appertains to
their office or duty, and which is supposed to be consonant to right and
justice, and where there is no other adequate specific remedy.322
The writ was incorporated into early American practice in state courts,323
and § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized the lower federal courts to grant
"all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for
the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and
usages of law." 32 4 This formulation underwent slight variation over the years325
and was enacted into its present form in the All Writs Act of 1948 as part of the
general codification of the Judicial Code that year.326
The Supreme Court held early on, in McIntire v. Wood 3 27 and McClung v.
Silliman,32 8 that the lower courts' mandamus power did not extend to actions
against federal officers,329 which remained the case for more than a century.
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated, they purported to
abolish the writ.3 30 But Rule 81(b) has been superseded in part, and the Supreme
Court's decisions in McIntire and McClung superseded entirely, by the
enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1361,331 which grants district courts mandamus power
332
It does not appear that Rule 81(b) has been used to
against executive officers.

322. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 614 (1838).
323. See, e.g., Exparte Breedlove, 24 So. 363, 363 (Ala. 1898) (granting writ of mandamus to
allow a party to intervene in the suit); People ex rel. People's Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Smith, 113
N.E. 891, 893 (Ill. 1916) (denying writ of mandamus because the order complained of was issued
within the trial judge's proper jurisdiction); Riverside Iron Works v. Hosmer, 58 N.W. 693, 693
(Mich. 1894) (granting writ of mandamus to set aside an intervention order); Woolley v. Wight, 238
P. 1114, 1116 (Utah 1925) (granting writ of mandamus against a trial judge to compel the
deposition of a witness); State ex rel. Nash v. Superior Court, 144 P. 898, 899 (Wash. 1914)
(granting writ of mandamus to avoid change of venue).
324. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (1789).
325. See Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Removal Jurisdiction and the All Writs Act, 148 U. PA.

L. REv. 401, 434 n.146 (1999).
326. See id. at 434; Petty, supra note 32, at 140 & n.17 (citing Act to Revise, Codify, and
Enact into Law Title 28 of the United States Code entitled "Judicial Code and Judiciary," Pub. L.
No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869 (1948); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 451 n.1
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
327. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813).
328. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821).
329. Id. at 604; McIntire, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 505-06 (holding that the Judiciary Act only
granted mandamus power in aid of the court's jurisdiction, not to compel action by executive
officers).
330. FED. R. CIV. P. 81(b).
331. Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748 § 1(a), 76 Stat. 744 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1361) (2006)).
332. Id.; Travis Christopher Barham, Congress Gave and Congress Hath Taken Away:
JurisdictionWithdrawal and the Constitution, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1139, 1177 (2005). The

rationale for enactment of the Mandamus and Venue Act is worth mentioning. In Kendall v. United
States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838), the Court held that the Circuit Court for the
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place any limitation on appellate mandamus 333 and, indeed, there has been a call
for the rule to be significantly rewritten.334
The writ of mandamus, it is said, is an "extraordinary remed[y]" 33 5 and
should only be used by an appellate court "where there is clear abuse of
discretion or 'usurpation of judicial power."' 336 Appellate mandamus is
permitted exclusively under the All Writs Act, and as the jurisdiction of the court
of appeals is appellate, a court's use of the writ must be in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.337 The Supreme Court has interpreted this broadly, to include
matters that might come within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals at some
later time. 3 38 "The traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction both
at common law and in the federal courts has been to confine an inferior court to a
lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its
authority when it is its duty to do so." 339 Importantly, the Court has held that the
All Writs Act is not an independent grant of appellate jurisdiction.340
Like many rules, this one is perhaps honored more in the breach than in the
observance. For the better part of the last century, appellate courts have used
mandamus not just to compel action or inaction on the part of the district courts,
but to substantively review certain decisions of the district courts. As early as
1932, commentators noted that courts used mandamus to review decisions
regarding venue, joinder, and intervention; to compel a witness to testiv; to
vacate the appointment of an auditor; and to simplify questions for a jury. 34 All

District of Columbia inherited the common law of Maryland as provided in the act of Congress that
created the court. Id. at 619-20. Thus, while the federal circuit court sitting in the District of
Columbia could issue writs ofmandamus to executive officers in accordance with its power derived
by federal statute from Maryland common law, no other federal courts had such power. Id. at 621.
The Mandamus and Venue Act resolved "this historical anomaly [created by Kendall] and extended
mandamus jurisdiction to all federal district courts." Simmat v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 413 F.3d
1225, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 2005).
333. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 ("These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and
proceedings in the United States district courts, except as stated in Rule 81.").
334. See Edward H. Cooper, Restyling the Civil Rules: Clarity Without Change, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1761, 1774 (2004) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 81(b)).
335. Exparte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259 (1947).
336. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953) (quoting De Beers Consol.
Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945)).
337. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 25 (1943).
338. Id.
339. Id. at 26 (citing Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 584 (1943); Interstate
Commerce Comm'n v. United States ex rel. Campbell, 289 U.S. 385, 394 (1933); Exparte Sawyer,
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 235, 238 (1874); Ex parte Newman, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 152, 165-66, 169
(1871)).
340. Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 41 (1985) (quoting U.S. Alkali
Exp. Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 203 (1945)) ("The writs may not be used as a substitute
for an authorized appeal . . . .").

341. Crick, supra note 19, at 555.
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this notwithstanding the supposed "elementary" proposition that mandamus
would not lie to correct errors or compel a certain result.3 42
Like the collateral order doctrine, appellate mandamus expanded in the midtwentieth century, only to contract again a few decades later. The growth was
subtle but steady. First, in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 343 the Supreme Court
permitted the court of appeals to issue a writ of mandamus to a district court to
compel it to perform its judicial function. 344 Judge La Buy had referred two
antitrust cases to a special master.345 All parties objected to the referral, but the
346
judge refused to vacate the order of referral because of his congested calendar.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's issuance of the writ on
relatively narrow grounds that arguably adhered to the traditional view of the
writ as compelling an inferior court to exercise mandatory jurisdiction.34 7 The
Court explained that there appeared to be a practice among the trial courts within
the Seventh Circuit to make undue use of Rule 53 to refer cases to masters when
they should not.348 Thus, La Buy could have been decided simply on the judge's
(apparently frequent) refusal to adjudicate matters that came before him. In
coming to its holding, however, the Court also suggested that "supervisory
control of the District Courts by the Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper
judicial administration in the federal system." 3 49 La Buy is widely seen as a
watershed decision,350 but the expansion of appellate mandamus was in fact a
much more slow and subtle process.
Atlass v. Miner351 took the expansion two steps further. In that case, the
Seventh Circuit granted the writ to resolve a conflict between a local district
court rule and the federal civil rules governing admiralty proceedings.3 52 The
Supreme Court affirmed, but the parties did not raise the propriety of mandamus,
and the Court remained silent on the subject. 3 53 Atlass, despite the Supreme

342. Steinman, supra note 2, at 1260 (quoting Interstate Commerce Comm 'n, 289 U.S. at 39394) (internal quotation marks omitted).
343. 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
344. Id. at 250-51.
345. Id. at 250.
346. Id. at 253-54.
347. See Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARv. L. REv. 351, 376 (1961)
("Since the Court relied heavily on the existence of an established practice in the particular district
of making such [referrals] . . . it apparently was attempting to cast its decision in the traditional
mold.").
348. La Buy, 352 U.S. at 258.
349. Id. at 259-60.
350. See Robert S. Berger, The Mandamus Power of the United States Courts of Appeals: A
Complex and Confused Means of Appellate Control, 31 BUFF. L. REv. 37, 50 (1982) ("[T]he case
does represent a less restrictive attitude toward the use of the mandamus power."); Redish, supra
note 5, at 115 ("[U]ndoubtedly some expansion has taken place [after La Buy] .... ); Steinman,
supra note 2, at 1260 ("Following La Buy's lead, the Supreme Court endorsed appellate mandamus
in a number of other situations.").
351. 265 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1959), aff'd, 363 U.S. 641 (1960).
352. 265 F.2d at 319.
353. 363 U.S. at 651-52.
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Court's silence, is notable in two respects. First, it supplemented La Buy's
holding that a recurring problem can be corrected by mandamus, by not
reversing the Seventh Circuit for correcting a problem by mandamus before it
recurred. 354 Second, and more importantly, it did this in the absence of an issue
concerning the jurisdiction of the district court. This is significant. Until this
point, the use of appellate mandamus, even in La Buy itself, was premised on the
assumption that it existed to compel or restrain the exercise of jurisdiction by a
lower court.
So if a question of the exercise of jurisdiction is not essential, and if an error
does not need to have recurred before mandamus will issue to correct it, then
mandamus should be available to correct just about any error that the petitioner
can convince the court of appeals is serious enough to warrant an extraordinary
remedy. Under Atlass, a general question applicable throughout a circuit was
sufficient to meet this standard, and perhaps the Court might be willing to go
further.
In Schlagenhaufv. Holder,3 55 the Court followed Atlass and upheld the use
of mandamus "to settle new and important problems." 356 There the issue, a
question of first impression, was the application of the "good cause" requirement
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 to order mental and physical
examinations of defendants. 357 But appellate mandamus never expanded much
beyond that as a general matter. In Will v. United States,358 the Court explained
that appellate mandamus as a supervisory tool was appropriate "where a district
judge displayed a persistent disregard of the Rules of Civil Procedure," 359 and in
Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co.,360 the Court added that appellate mandamus
is appropriate "[w]here a district court obstinately refuses to adjudicate a matter
properly before it." 361 Will v. United States returned to the traditional definition
of mandamus, "to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed
jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do
so, ,362 but it noted that because "the courts have never confined themselves to an
arbitrary and technical definition of 'jurisdiction,'

. . . only exceptional

circumstances amounting to a judicial 'usurpation of power' will justify the
invocation of [mandamus]." 363 Thus, the Court's brief flirtation with appellate
mandamus as a means to review "important questions" ended, though mandamus
was still available for substantive review of those questions, such as

354. 265 F.2d at 319.
355. 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
356. Id. at 111.
357. Id. at 110-11.
358. 389 U.S. 90 (1967).
359. Id. at 96 (citing La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., Inc., 352 U.S. 249 (1957)).
360. 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
361. Id. at 666-67 (plurality opinion).
362. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. at 95 (quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S.
21, 25 (1943)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
363. Id. (quoting De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945)).
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disqualification of judges, for which mandamus had long been the standard
means of review.
Unlike the collateral order doctrine, the standard for appellate mandamus is
reasonably fluid.364 This fluidity makes some sense, as mandamus is a
discretionary remedy, 365 but it also has the potential to create confusion. The
Court's most recent foray into appellate mandamus did little to make things
clearer. In Cheney v. United States District Court,366 the district court granted
plaintiffs leave to take certain discovery of the Vice President. 367 The Vice
President petitioned for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate
its order, which the court of appeals denied in light of the Vice President's
failure to assert executive rivilege.368 The Supreme Court ultimately remanded
for further consideration but, in so doing, attempted to formulate a standard
for when appellate mandamus is appropriate. The Court noted that mandamus is
a "'drastic and extraordinary' remedy 'reserved for really extraordinary
causes."' 370 The Court then explained that mandamus may be appropriate where
(1) the petitioner has no other means of relief (a requirement designed to prevent
the writ from circumventing the regular appeals process); (2) the petitioner
shows that his right to the issuance of the writ is "clear and undisputable"; and
(3) the issuing court is satisfied, in its discretion, that the writ is appropriate in
that particular case.371
Commentators have noted that Cheney's three-part test lacks a firm basis in
372
But the problems run much deeper and can be seen
Supreme Court precedent.
on the face of the standard itself. For one, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
reconcile the Supreme Court's directive that the final decision regarding whether
to issue the writ is purely discretionary (a determination that comports with
historical practice) with its insistence that the petitioner demonstrate a clear and
indisputable right to have the writ issue because there can be no right to
discretionary relief.3 73 The two are mutually exclusive. Moreover, the Cheney

364. See Glynn, supra note 4, at 217 ("[M]andamus review, unlike collateral order review,
must be governed by standards-rather than rules-that cannot be articulated with precision.");
Steinman, supra note 2, at 1263 ("Unlike the collateral order doctrine's oft-cited multipart test, the
Supreme Court has not provided a consistent set of requirements for appellate mandamus.").
365. See Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 112 n.8 (1964).
366. 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
367. Id. at 375.

368. In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096, 1098-99 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
369. 542 U.S. at 392.
370. Id. at 380 (quoting Exparte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259-60 (1947)).
371. Id. at 380-81 (quoting Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
372. See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 2, at 1269-70.
373. Perhaps what the Court actually meant was a clear and indisputable right to the relief the
writ is sought to correct, rather than a right to the issuance of the writ itself. The statement in
Cheney can be traced back to UnitedStates ex rel. Bernardin v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576 (1899), where

the Court explained, "[M]andamus will not ordinarily be granted ... unless the duty sought to be
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test fails to account for the numerous classes of cases where courts have allowed
review on a writ of mandamus, many of which involve issues of discretion or
case management where it would be extremely difficult to show a clear and
indisputable right to the relief sought.374
Notwithstanding this apparent confusion, Timothy Glynn has suggested the
standard is "unambiguously stringent," and in any event, the courts of appeals
are now appropriately conservative in their willingness to grant the writ.37 Few
grants are made, and those writs that are issued produce few dissents, few
disagreements in parallel circumstances, and no reversals by the Supreme
Court.376 This may be so, but it does not explain how appellate mandamus ought
to work or what its role in the larger scheme of appellate jurisdiction ought to be.
The Cheney test is clearly problematic, and its predecessor, which suggested that
mandamus should be "reserved for really extraordinary causes," 377 is even less
helpful. Thus, even if the courts have a good sense of when mandamus is and is
not appropriate as a categorical matter, a more searching inquiry is necessary
both to permit appellate mandamus to function most effectively and to prevent it
from encroaching on certain types of orders that might be more suitably
reviewed by other means.
III. HARMONIZING THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE

The final judgment rule is in need of harmonization. Despite the fact that
courts can more predictably apply the collateral order doctrine than they could in
the early 1990s, and that appellate mandamus no longer plays the catch-all role
that it sometimes has in the past, the Court has done little to explain the
principles on which appellate jurisdiction's new predictability rests. What those
principles are and how they work remains a mystery. The Court has rolled out
multi-pronged tests from time to time, but identifying what must be established
is a far cry from explaining why a particular proposition is meaningful in this
context. Similarly, the Court's new found consistency in applying the collateral
order doctrine and appellate mandamus say almost nothing (and certainly
nothing new) about how the two doctrines relate to each other, to the other
practical constructions of the final judgment rule, and to the governing statutes
and rules to form a coherent overall scheme of appellate jurisdiction.
The effect of these gaps in the underlying theory is unclear. Until very
recently the Court was more preoccupied with doctrinal minutiae than the
underlying rationale for the existence of the doctrines. As precedent has

enforced is clear and indisputable." Id. at 582 (emphasis added). But this is not the test the
Supreme Court laid out in Cheney, nor has it been employed for some time.
374. Steinman, supra note 2, at 1273-75 (listing orders over which "appellate courts have
exercised ... discretionary review").
375. Glynn, supra note 4, at 221.
376. Id. at 220-21.
377. Exparte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947).
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multiplied and answered most questions about applicability of the doctrines to
particular factual situations, the time has come to take a step back and approach
appellate jurisdiction from a broader perspective. With regard to the collateral
order doctrine, especially as fewer avenues remain open to would-be petitioners,
the Court is likely to see additional challenges to carelessly formulated standards
based on the underlying purposes of the doctrine. Now is the time to review
those policies and the accompanying doctrine, taking account of the other, more
marginalized doctrines of finality, and assess how the whole can be improved.
Given the Court's recent trends, adding new categories of appealable orders
seems unlikely. However, rearranging the mode of review for orders already
subject to interlocutory appeal and discarding doctrine based on concepts that
may no longer be good law may significantly improve our understanding of how
and when authority can be transferred from a court of first instance to a
reviewing court. Harmonization of appellate jurisdiction is possible and can be
accomplished using only the instruments currently available.
A. Recognizing the Difficulties
As far back as 1892, the Court conceded that "[p]robably no question of
equity practice has been the subject of more frequent discussion in this court
than the finality of decrees . . . . The cases, it must be conceded, are not

altogether harmonious."378 Most of the discord (at least over the last sixty years)
has concerned the collateral order doctrine. Justice Scalia noted two decades ago
"that our finality jurisprudence is sorely in need of further limiting principles,' 7
and in 2009 Justice Thomas suggested abandoning the collateral order doctrine
entirely, in large part because of the Court's difficulty in limiting it. 380
Any reexamination of appellate jurisdiction must begin with the collateral
order doctrine, simply because it is the basis of most litigation concerning
finality.381 The major problem in crafting sound limits for the collateral order
doctrine is that the governing standard (whether announced in Cohen, Coopers &
Lybrand, or Mitchell) is internally nonsensical.3 82 Writing in 1986, Judge Posner
noted:
[A]s with so many multi-"pronged" legal tests [the collateral order
doctrine] manages to be at once redundant, incomplete, and unclear.
The second "prong" [conclusivity] is part of the third [unreviewability].

378. McGourkey v. Toledo & Ohio Cent. Ry. Co., 146 U.S. 536, 544-45 (1892).
379. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 292 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring), superseded by statute, Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L 101-650, 104 Stat.
5089.
380. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 610 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
381. See Anderson, supra note 174, at 576.
382. See supraPart II.A.3.c.
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If the order sought to be appealed is not definitive, an immediate appeal
is not necessary to ward off harm; there is no harm yet. The first
"prong" [separability] seems unduly rigid; if an order unless appealed
really will harm the appellant irreparably, should the fact that it involves
an issue not completely separate from the merits of the proceeding
always prevent an immediate appeal? 383
The Supreme Court has never adequately addressed these concerns. Perhaps
the Court has not thought that explication of the theoretical basis of a
fundamentally practical doctrine would be particularly useful. Not only would a
theoretical basis for the collateral order doctrine be useful, however, a theoretical
rationale that ties together the various elements of appellate jurisdiction is
increasingly necessary. Given the longstanding recognition that the Court's
finality jurisprudence is insufficiently developed,38 4 and the frequency with
which the Court hears such cases (and criticizes its own doctrines), 38 the current
severely undertheorized state of appellate jurisdiction is somewhat surprising. A
critical reappraisal of the standard used to analyze appeals brought under the
collateral order doctrine may be useful in ascertaining why the doctrine and, to a
larger extent appellate jurisdiction generally, has failed to achieve any semblance
of a theoretical underpinning more nuanced than the unhelpfully general final
judgment rule. Moreover, a renewed collateral order doctrine, premised on a
broad theoretical understanding of the role it is meant to fill, might also alleviate
pressure on appellate mandamus to provide review where review by writ no
longer makes sense.
Because the Court has employed several standards for the collateral order
doctrine over the years, it is necessary to articulate what the controlling standard
is before attempting to refine it. In Cohen, the Court did not neatly summarize
the requirements to invoke the doctrine. Instead, it provided a number of
considerations that the Court has relied on to varying degrees in subsequent
cases. 3 86 The clearest expression of the doctrine seems to come from Coopers &
Lybrand. The Court explained:
To come within the "small class" of decisions excepted from the
final-judgment rule by Cohen, the order must conclusively determine
the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate

383. Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 1318 (7th Cir. 1986).
384. See supranotes 9-10 and accompanying text.
385. See Mohawk Indus., 130 S. Ct. at 610; Steinman, supra note 2, app. at 1296-97 (listing
Supreme Court cases addressing appellate jurisdiction since 1980).
386. See supra Part IJ.A.2.e.
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from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal
from a final judgment.38 7
In Mitchell, the Court did scale back the requirement that the order be
"completely separate" in favor of a "conceptually distinct" requirement, 388 but
since Mitchell, the Court has continued to employ the Coopers & Lybrand
formulation when discussing the requirements of the collateral order doctrine. 389
Based on the standard articulated in Coopers & Lybrand, the collateral order
doctrine, as it is currently understood, has four prongs: (1) conclusivity-the
order must conclusively determine the disputed question; (2) separability-the
subject matter of the order must be "completely separate" from the merits of the
case; (3) unreviewability-the order must effectively be unreviewable on appeal
from a final judgment; and (4) importance-the question to be resolved must
present an issue of sufficient importance to warrant interlocutory review.
B. Deconstructingthe CollateralOrder Doctrine

Much of the difficulty in applying the doctrine, as Judge Posner noted, stems
from the doctrine itself. The categories overlap, stand in opposition to generally
applicable jurisdictional rules and, ultimately, are not sufficiently tied to any
underlying principles to permit thoughtful application. Each prong of the test
obfuscates a clear understanding of the doctrine in some way.
1. Importance

The importance of the order sought to be reviewed is the weakest element of
the doctrine and therefore the easiest to dispose of. Indeed, some cases simply
do away with the importance requirement altogether. 3 90 This has led at least one

387. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (citing United States v.
MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 855 (1978); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977)).
388. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527, 529 n.10 (1985) (quoting Richardson-Merrell Inc.
v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 431 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
389. See, e.g., Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 433 (2007)
(using the Coopers & Lybrand formulation); Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (quoting
P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993)) (same); Sell v.
United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176 (2003) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468) (same);
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996) (quoting Richardson-Merrell Inc. v.
Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 431 (1985)) (same); Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794,
799 (1989) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468) (same); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard,
486 U.S. 517, 522 (1988) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468) (same).
390. See Anderson, supra note 174, at 567 (citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742
(1982)) ("The Moses H. Cone opinion made no reference to the . . . 'serious and unsettled question'
factor, although Nixon had just held that it was an 'additional factor."').
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Justice to suggest that the importance of the order should play a greater role in
the collateral order calculation. 391
Although facile avoidance of governing law is unlikely to clear anything up,
the recent calls to reinvigorate the importance requirement should be rebuffed.
First, "importance" is a highly malleable concept that leads one invariably to ask
"importance of what?" and "important to whom?" Since importance gains
meaning only from the context in which it arises, what kind of importance does
the collateral order doctrine concern itself with?
Cohen explained that the order in question in that case was important
because the question concerned application of the then-novel Erie doctrine, a
procedural question of general relevance. 392 But in Nixon the Court deemed
substantive issues to be important as well.3 93 The issue in Nixon concerned
presidential immunity 394a public concern-but there is little reason to suppose
that preservation of trade secrets, a private interest, might not be important as
well.
The problem with the importance factor, as Justice Thomas alluded to in his
concurrence in Mohawk Industries,395 is that any discussion of importance
necessarily results in case-by-case adjudication because the nature of the
396
importance can shift from one set of facts to another.
For example, a given
procedural question might not seem particularly important as a general matter,
but the same question might take on an entirely different color in the context of
national security.397 Thus, even approaching importance with a view to making
that determination on a category-wide basis is never going to be entirely
divorced from context. This is contrary to general propositions governing
jurisdiction and suggests that the importance inquiry may not be all that useful.
"Appeal rights," including the right to appeal itself, "cannot depend on the facts
of a particular case." 398 Yet, because importance means very little out of

391. See Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 291-92 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (citing Boreri v. Fiat S.P.A., 763 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1985)), superseded by statute,
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089. But see Mohawk Indus., Inc. v.
Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 611 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (suggesting that by continually "raising the bar on" the importance factor, the Court
perpetuates an unconvincing doctrine).
392. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949); see also Anderson,
supranote 174, at 547.
393. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 743 (1982) (holding that presidential immunity is
important).
394. Id.
395. See Mohawk Indus., 130 S. Ct. at 611.
396. See Anderson, supra note 174, at 589-90 (noting that the promotion of "importance" to a
place of preeminence in the collateral order doctrine in Digital Equipment contributed to "confusion
and instability in] an area greatly in need of clarification" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
397. See Nixon, 457 U.S. at 743 (noting the "special solicitude" of a claim of national
importance).
398. Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 405 (1957); see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S.
299, 311 (1996) ("[T]he question before us here . . . must be determined by focusing upon the
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context, reliance on the importance factor necessarily requires dependence on
specific facts.
The case-by-case determination of the importance factor has several
additional negative consequences.
First, because it is case-by-case, the
determination that some particular category of orders is sufficiently important
can provide almost no useful guidance. Given this, it is somewhat surprising
that there has not yet been a woeful amount of collateral litigation concerning
how to go about determining whether a particular category of orders is
important. Perhaps the lack of litigation is due to the Supreme Court's less-thanuniform application of this factor.3 99 At any rate, until such tests are devised,
there is nothing against which importance can systematically be measured.
These problems suggest that importance should be removed from the
collateral order calculus. It is unclear and malleable. Even when the Court
attempts to limit importance to whole categories of orders, the requirement is
still not exact enough to have a reasonable influence on a jurisdictional
determination.400 It is not particularly adept at providing future guidance and is
likely to result in satellite litigation. In short, the importance factor is a crutch.
It provides a back door for courts to permit or deny appeals and avoid the more
difficult-but more insightful-questions. If the collateral order doctrine is to be
revised, the importance factor should be the first prong to go.
2.

Conclusivity

Of the remaining factors, conclusivity is the most straightforward. This
factor simly requires that the order in question be final as to the issue in
question.
It must be a miniature final judgment. The order may not, like a
ruling on an evidentiary motion in limine or an order granting or denying class
certification, be tentative or subject to review at a later time.
This
Judge Posner suggested that conclusivity is part of unreviewability.
may be true in some cases but is not necessarily so in all. Conclusivity is only

category of order appealed from, rather than upon the strength of the grounds for reversing the
order."); Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 868 ("[T]he issue of appealability ... is to be determined for
the entire category to which a claim belongs, without regard to the chance that the litigation at hand
might be speeded, or a 'particular injustic[e]' averted, by a prompt appellate court decision."
(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529
(1988)); Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 529 ("In fashioning a rule of appealability ... we look to
categories of cases, not to particular injustices."); Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424,
439 (1985) ("This Court ... has expressly rejected efforts to reduce the finality requirement ... to a
case-by-case determination of whether a particular ruling should be subject to appeal.") (citing
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S 463, 473-75 (1978)).
399. See supraPart IJ.A.3.c.
400. See Anderson, supra note 174, at 565 (citing Nixon, 457 U.S. at 742-43).
401. See, e.g., Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (quoting P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer
Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993)) (requiring that the "order ... 'conclusively
determine the disputed question.').
402. See Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 1318 (7th Cir. 1986).
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part of unreviewability when unreviewability is equated with mootness. The
tentativeness of an order, standing alone, does not preclude appellate review.
Orders granting or denying class certification, for instance, are reviewed under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) notwithstanding the fact that the orders are
tentative and subject to revision before final judgment.403 In accordance with the
other doctrines of partial effective finality, conclusivity must remain an integral
part of the collateral order doctrine.
3.

Separability

With conclusivity, separability and unreviewability form the heart of the
collateral order doctrine. Perhaps because of its importance to the doctrine,
separability has been the source of a great deal of confusion over application of
the doctrine and the basis of much litigation. What is "completely separate from
the merits" 404 (or, at least, "conceptually distinct" 405)? We know that a right not
to stand trial passes this test, as does a right to not be involuntarily medicated.406
But again, like the importance factor, the terminology is more of a hindrance
than a help.
Take, for example, jurisdiction. Recently, the Supreme Court has explained
regularly that jurisdiction is something quite apart from the merits of an
action.
If anything is going to be "completely separate" from the merits,
jurisdiction surely is it. At the very least, jurisdiction is without a doubt
"conceptually distinct" from the merits.408 But no one seriously contends that
jurisdiction is the sort of ruling that might be appealable under the collateral
order doctrine. Despite its difference from the merits of the action, it is not the
right kind of difference. Thus, whether something is "completely separate" or
"conceptually distinct" from the merits is not a full explanation of what the
collateral order doctrine does or how it discriminates among different kinds of
orders. Something different is needed to explain what the separability
requirement actually does.

403. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
404. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (citing United States v.

McDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 855 (1978); Abney v. United Sates, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977)).
405. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985) (citing Abney, 431 U.S. at 659-60).
406. See supranotes 289-294 and accompanying text.
407. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243-44 (2010) (discussing the
distinction between jurisdictional issues and the merits of an action); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of
Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, 130 S. Ct. 584, 596-97 (2009) (same);
Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2005) (per curiam) (same).
408. But see Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction,54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613,

1614-15 (2003) (acknowledging that it is well-settled that jurisdiction and merits are distinct, but
contending they are conceptually part of the same inquiry).
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Unreviewability

What does it mean for an order to be unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment? Cohen can be read to suggest that an order is unreviewable if it
would be moot on appeal from a final judgment. 409 But not long after Cohen
was decided, the Court clouded the issue, holding that an order denying
attachment of a ship was appealable under the doctrine. 410 Presumably, the
Court concluded that the ship would sail out of the jurisdiction, rendering
continued proceedings ineffectual. But whether the ship would depart raised a
practical consideration. In Cohen, the order at issue concerned security.411 The
question would be moot as a matter of law if not decided before the litigation
concluded.4 12 The order denying attachment of the ship, by contrast, would not
necessarily be moot on appeal from the final judgment.
The Court might lose
jurisdiction over the vessel, so as a practical matter, the plaintiffs might no
longer be able to prosecute the action, but that is not truly mooting the case in
the sense that later proceedings obviate the need for or availability of preliminary
relief.
Later, the Court appeared to abandon the unreviewability requirement
entirely. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,414the Court applied only two factors,
conclusivity and separability.415 Thus, the Court has been less than clear about
whether the unreviewability requirement demands legal mootness-a practical
inability to further prosecute the action if an immediate appeal is not had-or if
it even matters at all.
C. Finality'sHidden Harmony

The test for determining whether an order is appealable as a collateral order,
as first announced in Cohen and later refined in Coopers & Lybrand and other
cases, is itself the largest impediment to a clear understanding of the collateral
order doctrine.416 The poor construction appears to be the work of largely ad
hoc, case-by-case formulation, which, until recently, lacked a theoretical
grounding or policy-based rationale linking the doctrine to the goals of appellate

409. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949); Anderson,
supranote 174, at 548.

410. See Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684, 68889 (1950).
411. See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545.
412. See id. at 546; cf Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) (citing Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545-47)
(holding that orders setting bail are appealable under Cohen).
413. Cf Swifi, 339 U.S. at 689 (speculating that "restoration of the attachment [would] only
[be] theoretically possible").
414. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
415. See id. at 172; Anderson, supra note 174, at 555.
416. See supra Part IJ.A.3.c.
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417

jurisdiction more generally.
The more recent theory has made the doctrine
more predictable and easier to apply by limiting its application to a handful of
immunity defenses.418 But this has come at the expense of any attempt to
improve the theoretical basis and has resulted in, perhaps, a too-narrow reading
of the doctrine.
Now that most of the doctrinal issues concerning application of the doctrine
have been settled, a reexamination of the method by which the doctrine is
applied is in order. At present, it appears that the semantics of the test, more
than any other factor, drive its substantive application. I suggest that this model
should be reversed. Application of the collateral order doctrine-an examination
of what it actually does-should inform the test employed to determine whether
it applies to a particular order. Applying that new standard might result in
increased clarity in other aspects of appellate jurisdiction as well.
1. Defining the Doctrine

I suggest that the current three- or four-pronged test can be distilled into one
simple inquiry: An order may not be appealed under the collateral order doctrine
if it is the kind of order that may be mooted downstream in litigation, that is, if a
judgment on the merits in the party's favor would obviate the need for the
interlocutory appeal. This formulation is, in its essentials, largely the same as
the current test (though the importance requirement is discarded),419 but
improves upon it in a number of respects. It leaves less room for litigation over
the components of the test; it better explains the nature of the doctrine; it forces
courts to confront the basis of the doctrine in deciding whether a particular order
qualifies; and it better comports with the other doctrines of effective finality.
The new definition also exposes the underlying purpose of the doctrine.
Permitting interlocutory review of orders that will not be mooted downstream in
litigation permits review where the harm to be avoided is necessarily immediate,
and where awaiting final judgment on the merits would serve no purpose, as the
harm will have occurred and reversal at that point would not undo the harm.
This test disposes of one element of the current test (importance) and
reduces the remaining three elements to one inquiry. Each of the remaining
three elements of the collateral order doctrine is subsumed within the new
inquiry. First, the conclusivity requirement remains essentially unchanged.
Appellate jurisdiction must be determined on a category-wide basis.420 An order
will not necessarily be mooted downstream in litigation if it is tentative or
subject to revision. Therefore, under my standard, as under the current standard,
an order that is not conclusive will not be appealable.

417.
418.
419.
420.

See supra Part II.A.3.c.
See supra Part II.A.3.c.iii.
See supra Part III.B.
See Glynn, supra note 4, at 209-10.
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The separability requirement is also preserved. Under my standard an order
cannot be appealed if it is of a kind that could be mooted downstream in
litigation. Thus, if a judgment on the merits in the party's favor would render
the requested interlocutory appeal unnecessary, the order cannot be appealed.
Orders that merge in the final judgment, or that could be remedied by a final
judgment in the party's favor, are not appealable.
Finally, unreviewability is maintained in the new standard. An order that
cannot be mooted downstream in litigation and that cannot be remedied by a
final judgment in the party's favor necessarily concerns rights that would be
irretrievably lost if not corrected by interlocutory review. Review later will not
be able to provide the relief sought.
This approach has some support in case law. In Budinich v. Becton
Dickinson & Co.,421 the Court explained that "[a] question remaining to be
decided after an order ending litigation on the merits does not prevent finality if
its resolution will not alter the order or moot or revise decisions embodied in the
order." 422 The Budinich Court was referring to the doctrines of effective
finality,423 but applying the same logic to the collateral order doctrine-a
question of partial effective finality-suggests that an order is collateral when it
is not subject to revision and will not be mooted by events downstream in
litigation. Thus, the new standard not only finds precedential support, but at the
same time, better reflects effective finality jurisprudence as a general matter.
Indeed, a simplified collateral order doctrine would share much in common
with the other doctrines of partial effective finality. The Perlman doctrine and
the contempt cases have essentially two bases for appealability: the
independence of the order to be reviewed from the general subject matter of the
action, and the lack of efficacious review at a later time. 42 4 Separability and
unreviewability are the corresponding elements of the current collateral order
test. The suggested changes to the test, which focus on and distill those two
elements, would bring the collateral order doctrine back in line with its partial
effective finality cousins.
Cohen itself also offers support for the revised test, especially with regard to
the separability requirement. The Coopers & L brand statement that an order
must be "completely separate" from the merits 5 is a poor description of what
the Court has actually required, and it finds little support in Cohen itself.
Instead, Cohen instructed that an order may be sufficiently separate when it does
not take a "step toward final disposition of the merits of the case," when it will
not affect or be affected by the merits, and where it "is not an ingredient of the

421. 486 U.S. 196 (1988).
422. Id. at 199.
423. See id..
424. See supranotes 191-194, 211-215 and accompanying text.
425. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (citing United States v.
MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 855 (1978); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977)).
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cause of action and does not require consideration with it."'426 Rather than being
"completely separate" or even "conceptually distinct" from the merits, Cohen
required separability only to the extent that the order in question not take a step
toward a final judgment on the merits.427 The new standard reaffirms Cohen's
requirement that the order in question simply be of a kind incapable of being
mooted by events downstream in the litigation.428
On a practical level, the new definition would change little in terms of what
type of orders would qualify for collateral treatment. Evidentiary rulings, for
instance, are tentative and therefore would still fall outside the scope of the
doctrine. Jurisdiction fails the test because reversal on appeal would remedy the
harm from the error. Immunity defenses (rights not to stand trial but not rights to
avoid liability), as now, would qualify because the reversal on appeal would not
prevent the harm sought to be avoided (the trial).
Redefining collateral orders as those that are incapable of being mooted
downstream in litigation or those that will not be remedied by a judgment on the
merits in the party's favor simplifies the current test, reduces avenues for courts
to engage in analysis divorced from the underlying principles of appellate
jurisdiction, and harmonizes the collateral order doctrine with other doctrines of
partial effective finality. Moreover, the new test accomplishes all this while
preserving the essential elements of the current test, and does so in a manner
consistent with precedent. It clarifies a confused doctrine by reference to
underlying principles, rather than rewriting it entirely. In practical terms, the
change would not have a significant effect on the type of orders reviewable
under the collateral order doctrine, but at the margins, the doctrine would likely
embrace some orders that currently fall outside of the its scope. The effect of
slightly broadening the scope of the doctrine would likely be increased stability
and predictability in appellate jurisdiction generally.
2.

Effects on Appellate Jurisdiction

By reducing the degree of separability necessary for appealability under the
collateral order doctrine and doing away with the importance factor entirely,
certain classes of orders currently subject to interlocutory review by other means
would become reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. This is especially
valuable where the current means of review is of questionable propriety or, at
least, clearly strained.
Take, for example, orders denying motions to transfer venue. These orders
have traditionally been granted interlocutory review by means of appellate
mandamus. 429 The reason for this is unclear but perhaps may result from courts'

426. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949).
427. See id. at 546.

428. Id.
429. See In re LimitNone, LLC, 551 F.3d 572, 576 (7th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Hicks v.

Duckworth, 856 F.2d 934, 935 (7th Cir. 1988) (listing numerous cases in which "[t]he use of
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former treatment of venue as jurisdictional.43 0 In any event, federal courts no
longer consider venue jurisdictional,4 31 so any hold that venue may have had on
the requirement that use of mandamus must be in aid of jurisdiction is no longer
viable.
Revising the collateral order doctrine as described above would open a new
avenue for review of transfer orders. An order granting or denying a motion to
transfer is conclusive. 432 It is not tentative and cannot be changed later except
upon a motion to reconsider, and even then not after the transfer is effectuated.
Moreover, transfer does not accomplish any step toward the resolution of the
merits because the venue concerns only convenience and fairness to the
parties.4 34 Under the new standard, venue is collateral because it would not be
mooted by events downstream in litigation, and a judgment on the merits in the
party's favor would not undo the harm in being forced to litigate in an
inconvenient forum-perhaps where the parties had agreed to litigate elsewhere.
Similarly, orders denying motions for recusal are often reviewed by
appellate mandamus. 4 35 Under the revised collateral order doctrine, those orders
would qualify for an interlocutory appeal. The orders themselves are conclusive
(sometimes blisteringly so), and even if the losing movant ultimately prevails,
the favorable judgment would not undo the damage-a case presided over by a
biased judge or, at the very least, a proceeding tainted by the appearance of
impropriety.
Reviewing substantive decisions such as denials of motions to transfer or
motions for recusal under the collateral order doctrine rather than by
extraordinary writ promises several advantages, both to appellate mandamus
specifically and to appellate jurisdiction generally. With regard to appellate
mandamus, reviewing substantive decisions under the collateral order doctrine
rather than by mandamus would improve and clarify the scope of appellate
mandamus. The statute is broad; limiting its reach to compelling or prohibiting
actions would bring appellate mandamus closer in line with its counterpart in the
district court and, arguably, with its historical forebears. The effect of this would

mandamus to correct an erroneous transfer out of circuit ha[d] been approved"); People ex rel.
People's Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Smith, 113 N.E. 891, 893 (Ill. 1916); Crick, supra note 19, at 55455 (citing Ex ParteWagner, 249 U.S. 465, 471-72 (1919)). But see Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v.
Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 380-82 (1953) (holding appellate mandamus is not a permissible vehicle
with which to challenge transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)).
430. See Crick, supra note 19, at 554-55 (citing People's Gas Light & Coke Co., 113 N.E.

891) (suggesting that erroneously granting or refusing to change venue is an example of an order
issued without jurisdiction).
431. 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
432. 15 id. § 3855.

§ 3801

(3d ed. 2007).

433. See id. § 3846.
434. See id. § 3847.
435. See, e.g., In re United States, 572 F.3d 301, 307 (7th Cir. 2009) ("[A] petition for writ of
mandamus . . . is the proper . . . means of reviewing a district court's denial of a motion for
recusal.").
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also strengthen mandamus as a discretionary safety valve. Unlike the collateral
order doctrine and other doctrines applying the final judgment rule, appellate
mandamus is a true statutory exception to the general rule of appellate
jurisdiction. Therefore, it need not apply a categorical approach to determining
what orders come within its scope. Indeed, one might say that mandamus is not
amenable to categorical application because its strength lies in its flexibility,
provided the underlying basis for the writ is sufficiently egregious. By shifting
to the collateral order doctrine responsibility for determining whether a particular
category of orders may be subject to substantive interlocutory review, the
discretionary function of appellate mandamus will be able to develop
unencumbered by hazy distinctions between various grounds for eligibility.
IV. CONCLUSION

The many distinct grounds for appellate jurisdiction, particularly the judicial
interpretations of § 1291, have not received adequate attention and are not well
understood. The collateral order doctrine, the most important of these doctrines,
has been similarly undertheorized for most of its existence. The recent clarity
the Supreme Court has introduced is helpful, but ultimately of limited utility.
Instead of reasoning from the doctrine's and appellate jurisdiction's underlying
principles, drawing parallels to similar doctrines, the Court has all too often
reasoned from its own earlier pronouncements without reference to policy,
theory, or the context that gives meaning to the statute.
A reassessment of the language the Court uses to apply the collateral order
doctrine is well past due. I suggest that the importance factor is inconsistent
with the requirement that appellate jurisdiction be premised on category-wide
rules. 436 The remaining factors can be collapsed into a single inquiry: Could a
favorable judgment on the merits moot whatever interlocutory relief is sought?
This inquiry balances the pragmatism necessary to blunt the effect of § 1291
with the necessity to apply jurisdictional rules categorically. It provides a
stronger theoretical-and less semantic-basis for the collateral order doctrine.
Finally, it paves the way for clearer application of other rules of appellate
jurisdiction.
No full-fledged revision of appellate jurisdiction is necessary. Further
legislative enactments and rule-making would most likely not help matters. The
building blocks of a sensible regime of appellate review already exist. A few,
however, remain out of place. A small change would bring significant clarity to
a poorly understood, but vitally important, area of law.

436. See supra Part III.B.1.
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